Law Commons^™

Slides: Modifying Prior Appropriation: The Spectrum Of Experiences, Adam Schempp

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Adam Schempp, Environmental Law Institute, Washington, DC

12 slides

Slides: Opportunities: Softer Paths?, Sarah Bates

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Sarah Bates, Public Policy Research Institute, University of Montana

2 slides

Slides: Economic Incentives For Demand Reduction, Christopher Goemans

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Christopher Goemans, Department of Agriculture & Resource Economics, Colorado State University

17 slides

Agenda: Western Water Law, Policy And Management: Ripples, Currents, And New Channels For Inquiry, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center, Western Water Policy Program

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

In many pockets of the American West, stresses and demands on water resources are overwhelming our capacity to effectively manage change and accommodate the diversity of interests and values associated with our limited water resources.

This event will offer an opportunity for lawyers, policymakers, and water professionals to engage the experts on the challenges and emerging solutions to the most pressing water policy and management issues of the day.

Alternatives To Regulation?: Market Mechanisms And The Environment, David M. Driesen

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This book chapter presents a discussion of instrument choice in institutional context, with an emphasis on the Kyoto Protocol as an example of environmental benefit trading under a multilevel governance arrangement. Typically, economic models and qualitative discussion of instrument choice implicitly assume that a single regulator selects, designs, and enforces regulatory instruments. Increasingly, however, multiple polities implement regulatory instruments together. The Kyoto Protocol, for example, includes international, regional, national, sub-national, and private roles in the design and enforcement of emissions trading. This chapter emphasizes that design and enforcement are critical, as market mechanisms do not "automatically" produce environmental progress; rather …

An Environmental Competition Statute, David M. Driesen

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This chapter from a forthcoming Cambridge Press book, Beyond Environmental Law, proposes emulating free market dynamics with a new regulatory instrument, the Environmental Competition Statute. This statute would authorize any polluter making a pollution reduction to require a dirtier competitor to reimburse it for the full cost of making this improvement along with a preset profit margin. This creates an economic dynamic similar to that prevailing in very competitive markets. In such markets, those who innovate in effect take money from those who do not, by taking over a portion of their market share. This statute similarly allows environmental innovators …

Liability Insurance At The Tort-Crime Boundary, Tom Baker

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores how liability insurance mediates the boundary between torts and crime. Liability insurance sometimes separates these two legal fields, for example through the application of standard insurance contract provisions that exclude insurance coverage for some crimes that are also torts. Perhaps less obviously, liability insurance also can draw parts of the tort and criminal fields together. For example, professional liability insurance civilizes the criminal law experience for some crimes that are also torts by providing defendants with an insurance-paid criminal defense that provides more than ordinary means to contest the state’s accusations. The crime-tort separation in liability insurance …