Law Commons^™

Consumer Interest In Corporate Law, David Yosifon

Faculty Publications

This Article provides a comprehensive assessment of the consumer interest in dominant theories of the corporation and in the fundamental doctrines of corporate law. In so doing, the Article fills a void in contemporary corporate law scholarship, which has failed to give sustained attention to consumers in favor of exploring the interests of other corporate stakeholders, especially shareholders, creditors, and workers. Utilizing insights derived from the law and behavioralism movement, this Article examines, in particular, the limitations of the shareholder primacy norm at the heart of prevailing "nexus of contracts" and "team production" theories of the firm. The Article concludes …

Art Deaccessions And The Limits Of Fiduciary Duty, Sue Chen

Duke Law Student Papers Series

Art deaccessions prompt lawsuits against museums, and some commentators advocate using the stricter trust standard of care, instead of the prevailing corporate standard (business judgment rule), to evaluate the conduct of non‑profit museum boards. This Article explores the consequences of adopting the trust standard by applying it to previously unavailable deaccession policies of prominent art museums. It finds that so long as museum boards adhere to these policies, their decisions would satisfy the trust standard. This outcome illustrates an important limitation of fiduciary law: the trust standard evaluates procedural care but cannot assess deaccessions on their merits. Yet this limitation, …

Behind Close Doors: Governance Issues In Private Equity Driven Industries – The Close Corporation Paradox And Its Impact On Private Equity In The Us And Sweden, Kristian Hermanrud

Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate Student Conference Papers

Publicly traded companies make up only a small fraction of the vast number of corporations operating in the US today. Only about 10,000 companies are traded publicly while there are roughly 20 million corporations doing business in the US. Likewise, over 245 private corporations’ annual revenues exceed $1 billion. Among these, more than twelve employ more than 50,000 employees. Despite the influence on vast amounts of people and capital legislature has, to a large degree, focused on publicly traded companies. The reasons for this stem, in large, back to the years of the market crash in the early thirties and …

The Evolution Of Debt: Covenants, The Credit Market, And Corporate Governance, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals For Reform, Antony Page

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this Review discusses the modem "nexus of contracts" approach to corporations and highlights how Greenfield's views differ. Part II examines corporate goals and purposes, suggesting that Greenfield overstates the impact of the shareholder-primacy norm and does not offer a preferable alternative. Part III critiques the means to the ends--Greenfield's proposals for changing the mechanics of corporate governance. Although several of his proposals are intriguing, they seem unlikely to achieve their pro-social aims. This Review remains skeptical, in part because-even given its problems-the U.S. "director-centric governance structure has created the most successful economy the world has ever seen." …

The (Misunderstood) Genius Of American Corporate Law, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

In this Reply, I respond to comments by Bill Bratton, Larry Cunningham, and Todd Henderson on my recent paper - Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of Federalism for Corporate Governance. I begin by reiterating my basic thesis - that state competition should be understood to have little consequence for corporate governance, if (as charter competition's advocates assume) capital-market-driven managerial competition is also at work. I then consider some of the thoughtful critiques of this claim, before suggesting ways in which the comments highlight just the kind of comparative institutional analysis my paper counsels. Rather than a stark choice …

Trapped In A Metaphor: The Limited Implications Of Federalism For Corporate Governance, Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

Trapped in a metaphor articulated at the founding of modern corporate law, the study of corporate governance has - for some thirty years - been asking the wrong questions. Rather than a singular race among states, whether to the bottom or the top, the synthesis of William Cary and Ralph Winter’s famous exchange is better understood as two competitions, each serving distinct normative ends. Managerial competition advances the project that has motivated corporate law since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means - effective regulation of the separation of ownership and control. State competition, by contrast, does not promote a race to …

The Story Of Hewlett-Packard, Barbara Black

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

With the development of the modern corporation, corporate boards have been the locus of corporate authority, and particularly since the 1980s, boards and their performance have been under intense scrutiny. Nevertheless, corporate law has not developed a consistent theory for what boards are supposed to do; instead, it sends mixed messages about the functions and expectations of boards and the appropriate people to sit on them. The HP saga illustrates some of the dilemmas faced by directors confronted by these competing pressures.

Administrative Governance As Corporate Governance: A Partial Explanation For The Growth Of China's Stock Markets, David A. Caragliano

Michigan Journal of International Law

This Note argues that during the first decade of stock market development (roughly 1990-2000) Chinese institutions, which emphasized administrative direction and control, functioned in lieu of legal and financial institutions. Preexisting modes of administrative governance introduced incentives that mitigated information asymmetry problems inherent in initial public offerings (IPOs) and contributed to enhanced market valuation during the post-IPO phase. The author focuses on two sui generis Chinese institutions employed during this time period: the quota system for equity share issuance and the Special Treatment (ST) system for underperforming issuers. In short, the thesis is that administrative governance substituted for corporate governance.

Unconscious Bias And The Limits Of Director Independence, Antony Page

Faculty Publications

Corporate directors make difficult decisions: How much should we pay our CEO? Should we permit a lawsuit against a fellow director? Should we sell the company? Directors are legally obligated to decide in good faith based on the business merits of the issue rather than extraneous considerations and influences. Naturally, some directors may have preferences, or even biases: Our CEO, my colleague and friend, deserves a lot; The company should not sue my fellow board member; We should not sell, because after all, I would like to remain a board member. But the courts presume that independent directors either do …

Employee Participation In Corporate Governance: An Ethical Analysis, Michael Lp Lower

Michael LP Lower

This paper outlines why CST has called for employees to be involved in the governance of the firms that they work for and a share in ownership. It points out the economic issues involved as part of its broader ethical analysis. The John Lewis Partnership is pointed to as a good working model. The possible use of ESOPs to bring about desirable changes is considered. The case for mandatory codetermination is outlined.

Enhancing The Efficiency Of Board Decision Making: Lessons Learned From The Financial Crisis Of 2008, Bernard S. Sharfman

Bernard S Sharfman

As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, the employment compensation policies and decisions of Wall Street corporate boards have come under close scrutiny. More specifically, the willingness to approve company wide compensation plans that resulted in the paying out of billions of dollars in bonuses even in the face of deteriorating financial and economic conditions. If only these and other Wall Street firms had retained the bulk of these large annual bonuses over the last several years when the financial markets were noticeably in decline, perhaps the economic impact of the current financial crisis would have been less …

A Voice-Based Framework For Evaluating Claims Of Minority Shareholder Oppression In The Close Corporation, Benjamin Means

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Dangers Of Equitable Remedies, Mary Siegel

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

Introduction: "While Delaware jurisprudence is renowned for its clarity and sophistication, one area of its corporate case law is, by design, uncharacteristically ambiguous: equitable remedies. One Delaware judge summarized his equitable powers as follows: " [T]his court will use its 'broad discretion to tailor [a remedy] to suit the situationas it exists.' As Delaware has long recognized, 'the Court of Chancery [has] the inherent powers of equity to adapt its relief to the particular rights and liabilities of each party." The most well known of the equitable remedies is the Schnell doctrine, which allows the court to invalidate conduct that …

Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures In An Era Of Excessive Executive Compensation And Ponzi Schemes, Miriam A. Cherry, Jarrod Wong

All Faculty Scholarship

In the spring of 2009, public outcry erupted over the multi-million dollar bonuses paid to AIG executives even as the company was receiving TARP funds. Various measures were proposed in response, including a 90% retroactive tax on the bonuses, which the media described as a "clawback." Separately, the term "clawback" was also used to refer to remedies potentially available to investors defrauded in the multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme run by Bernard Madoff. While the media and legal commentators have used the term "clawback" reflexively, the concept has yet to be fully analyzed. In this article, we propose a doctrine of …

Undressing The Ceo: Disclosing Private, Material Matters Of Public Company Executives, Tom C.W. Lin

UF Law Faculty Publications

Disclosing material private matters of public company executives is a difficult and complex but sometimes necessary act. Advocates that favor more disclosure and advocates that favor more privacy both have many legitimate arguments and concerns. This article argues that when viewed in the context of contemporary capital markets, the enhanced role of the executive, and the modern media, additional disclosure from executives about material, private matters is desirable. In support of this argument, this article proposes a principle-based approach for executive disclosure that affords companies and executives reasonable deference on what to disclose and how to disclose it, while simultaneously …

Civil Liability And Mandatory Disclosure, Merritt B. Fox

Faculty Scholarship

This Article explores the efficient design of civil liability for mandatory securities disclosure violations by established issuers. An issuer not publicly offering securities at the time of a violation should have no liability. Its annual filings should be signed by an external certifier – an investment bank or other well-capitalized entity with financial expertise. If the filing contains a material misstatement and the certifier fails to do due diligence, the certifier should face measured liability. Officers and directors should face similar liability, capped relative to their compensation but with no indemnification or insurance allowed. Damages should be payable to the …

Agenda For Private Sector Reform: Omnibus Policy Recommendations For A Post-Crisis Market, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The global financial crisis has exposed a raft of market weaknesses and failures The Center has concentrated on probing urgent, corporate governance-related issues where it identified apparent gaps in knowledge, insight and infrastructure. Policy Briefings have addressed the advisory vote on executive compensation; board-shareowner communications; proxy voting reform; independent board leadership; risk oversight; pay for performance; and shareowner stewardship. Using global perspectives, they address key concerns within the relevant subject areas and attempt to gather and present practical recommendations and ideas.

This report compiles summaries of the Center’s recommendations on these seven key areas from 2007 through mid-2009. The objective …

Pay, Risk And Stewardship: Private Sector Architecture For Future Capital Markets, Mariana Pargendler

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The recent financial crisis revealed a massive failure of institutions that populate the world’s capital markets. Banks, investors, ratings agencies, regulators and numerous other players demonstrated that confidence in market responses was misplaced. The loss of faith in capital market institutions has represented a significant hurdle to recovery as financial institutions continue to be wary of one another, and the public is wary of all of them.

Restoring trust in the system requires two distinct pillars of reform. The first pillar, reform of the financial regulatory system, both nationally and globally, has received most of the attention so far. Many …

Chairing The Board: The Case For Independent Leadership In Corporate North America, Millstein Center For Corporate Governance And Performance

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

The number of non-executive chairmen at companies in North America has been increasing year by year. Recent figures, according to the 2008 Spencer Stuart Board Index, indicate that the last decade has seen a growing trend in separating the roles of the Chief Executive Officer (ceo) and the chairman of the board. In 1998, 16% of the s&p 500 featured distinct chairmen. Data shows that in 2008 as many as 39% appoint someone other than the ceo to chair the board. Traditionally, even in companies that split the role, the chairman was not completely independent, but rather commonly the ex-ceo …

Voting Integrity: Practices For Investors And The Global Proxy Advisory Industry, Meagan Thompson-Mann

Ira M. Millstein Center for Global Markets and Corporate Ownership

Accountability of corporate boards to shareowners rests in large part on the integrity of the system by which investors vote their proxy ballots. Shareowners rely on the vote to affect the governance of a company; corporate directors see the vote as a barometer of investor confidence in board stewardship. Outcomes determine the fate of director tenure, mergers, acquisitions, capital raising, remuneration plans and other critical decisions with sometimes profound consequences for stakeholders and the marketplace.

However, this briefing finds that the proxy voting system in the US and other markets is chronically subject to criticism that it is short on …

The Corporate Lawyer's Role In A Contemporary Democracy, Colin Marks, Nancy B. Rapoport

Scholarly Works

This paper reviews the traditional arguments for corporate social responsibility and asks the question of what corporate lawyers should do to help their clients do the right thing ethically. It also sets out a test - the technically test -- that highlights when something is usually on the wrong side of the ethical line. (If you have to give legal advice starting with "Well, technically...," you're on the wrong side of the line.)

The Real Reason Why Businesses Make Bad Decisions, Nancy B. Rapoport

Scholarly Works

This book review examines Professor Jonathan Macey's latest book on corporate governance, and it uses Professor Macey's analysis to explain the latest rash of corporate scandals.

Conflicts And Financial Collapse: The Problem Of Secondary-Management Agency Costs, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Corporate governance scholarship has long focused on conflicts of interest between firms and their top executive officers. This Essay contends that increasing leverage and financial complexity make it important for scholars to also focus on conflicts of interest between firms and their secondary managers.

Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant M. Hayden, Matthew T. Bodie

All Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, we contest one of the main arguments for restricting corporate board voting to shareholders. In justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, scholars have repeatedly turned to social choice theory—specifically, Arrow’s theorem—to justify the exclusive shareholder franchise. Citing to the theorem, corporate law commentators have argued that lumping different groups of stakeholders together into the electorate would result in a lack of consensus and, ultimately, the lack of coherence that attends intransitive social choices, perhaps even leading the corporation to self-destruct. We contend that this argument is misguided. First, we argue that scholars have greatly overestimated …

Competition Policy And Comparative Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises, D. Daniel Sokol

UF Law Faculty Publications

The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate governance-the governance of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs"). There are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance across legal origins. In …

When 'Good' Corporate Governance Makes 'Bad' (Financial) Firms: The Global Crisis And The Limits Of Private Law, Nicholas C. Howson

Articles

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, investors, analysts, legislators, and pundits have spotlighted “good” or “improved” corporate governance as a remedy for all that presently ails us. It is one remedy in a long wish list that includes tougher requirements for risk capital, liquidity, and leverage; compensation and bonus reform; reimposition ofthe Glass-Steagall-like separation of bank “utility” and “casino” functions; the downsizing or breakup of institutions deemed “too big to fail;” enhanced consumer protection; securities law liability for secondary violators (like credit rating agencies); direct taxation of proprietary trading; “macroprudential” regulation; and new transparency requirements for …

Monitoring Of Corporate Groups By Independent Directors, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

Both the United States and Korea have reformed their corporate governance in recent years to put increasing responsibilities on independent directors. Independent directors have been found to be an important force protecting the interests of shareholders when it comes time to make certain highly salient decisions, such as firing a CEO or selling the company. This article compares the role of independent directors in the US and Korean systems. I argue that the US may have placed regulatory burdens on independent directors that they are unlikely to be able to satisfy, given their part-time status. By contrast, in the chaebol …