Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Merit Selection And Performance Evaluation Of Alaska’S Judges, Teresa W. Carns
Merit Selection And Performance Evaluation Of Alaska’S Judges, Teresa W. Carns
Alaska Law Review
No abstract provided.
Depoliticizing Administrative Law, Cass R. Sunstein, Thomas J. Miles
Depoliticizing Administrative Law, Cass R. Sunstein, Thomas J. Miles
Duke Law Journal
A large body of empirical evidence demonstrates that judicial review of agency action is highly politicized in the sense that Republican appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate liberal agency decisions than conservative ones, while Democratic appointees are significantly more likely to invalidate conservative agency decisions than liberal ones. These results hold for both (a) judicial review of agency interpretations of law and (b) judicial review of agency decisions for "arbitrariness" on questions of policy and fact. On the federal courts of appeals, the most highly politicized voting patterns are found on unified panels, that is, on panels consisting solely …
Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, Joanna M. Shepherd
Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, Joanna M. Shepherd
Duke Law Journal
The conventional wisdom among many legal scholars is that judicial independence can best be achieved with an appointive judiciary; judicial elections turn judges into politicians, threatening judicial autonomy. Yet the original supporters of judicial elections successfully eliminated the appointive systems of many states by arguing that judges who owed their jobs to politicians could never be truly independent. Because the judiciary could function as a check and balance on the other governmental branches only if it truly were independent of them, the reformers reasoned that only popular elections could ensure a truly independent judiciary. Using a data set of virtually …
A Response To Professor Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, Michael Boudin
A Response To Professor Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences, Michael Boudin
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court And The Chaos Of 1993, J. Mark Ramseyer
Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court And The Chaos Of 1993, J. Mark Ramseyer
Duke Law Journal
Empiricists routinely explain politically sensitive decisions of the U.S. federal courts through the party of the executive or legislature appointing the judge. That they can do so reflects the fundamental independence of the courts. After all, appointment politics will predict judicial outcomes only when judges are independent of sitting politicians. Because Japanese Supreme Court justices enjoy an independence similar to that of U.S. federal judges, I use judicial outcomes to ask whether Japanese premiers from different parties have appointed justices with different political preferences. Although the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan for most of the postwar period, it temporarily …
Do Judges Think? Comments On Several Papers Presented At The Duke Law Journal’S Conference On Measuring Judges And Justice, Robert Henry
Do Judges Think? Comments On Several Papers Presented At The Duke Law Journal’S Conference On Measuring Judges And Justice, Robert Henry
Duke Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Money, Politics, And Impartial Justice, Joanna M. Shepherd
Money, Politics, And Impartial Justice, Joanna M. Shepherd
Duke Law Journal
A centuries-old controversy asks whether judicial elections are inconsistent with impartial justice. The debate is especially important because more than 90 percent of the United States' judicial business is handled by state courts, and approximately nine in ten of all state court judges face the voters in some type of election. Using a stunning new data set of virtually all state supreme court decisions from 1995 to 1998, this paper provides empirical evidence that elected state supreme court judges routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money. I find that judges who must be reelected by Republican voters, …