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Full-Text Articles in Law
Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant Hayden, Matthew Bodie
Arrow's Theorem And The Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, Grant Hayden, Matthew Bodie
Vanderbilt Law Review
The doctrine of shareholder primacy has received substantial attention from its legions of proponents, its indefatigable opponents, and even its disinterested observers. The notion that a corporation should be run in the interests of its shareholders is the theoretical foundation upon which modern corporate law stands. Almost all empirical study in corporate law is premised on a notion of shareholder primacy, and these results would lose much of their meaning if the theory were somehow disproved. Perhaps most importantly, shareholders do in fact have primacy of place within the corporation, as they alone generally have the right to elect the …
Pragmatic Selective Waiver: Re-Aligning Corporate Executives' Personal Interests With Those Of The Corporation Amidst Government Investigations, Erin M. Carter
Pragmatic Selective Waiver: Re-Aligning Corporate Executives' Personal Interests With Those Of The Corporation Amidst Government Investigations, Erin M. Carter
Vanderbilt Law Review
In the corporate setting, government investigators increasingly ask corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege as part of the "cooperation" necessary to receive incentives. In practice, however, these cooperation incentives have led to what has become known as a "culture of waiver," where waiver of the privilege in the face of investigation has become virtually essential. One way courts have sought to diminish the negative externalities of waiver is through the doctrine of selective waiver. Selective waiver allows the corporation to waive the attorney-client privilege, but only to the government agency during the course of the investigation, while still retaining the …
Corporate Voting, Robert B. Thompson, Paul H. Edelman
Corporate Voting, Robert B. Thompson, Paul H. Edelman
Vanderbilt Law Review
What are we to make of shareholder voting? Delaware law presents voting as the ideological underpinning of a corporate governance system that gives directors wide control over other people's money. In the legal commentary, there are recurring descriptions of corporations as representative democracies in which New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law & Professor of Management, Vanderbilt University.
.. Professor of Mathematics and Law, Vanderbilt University. We have benefited from the comments of Jeff Gordon, Sam Issacharoff, Curtis Milhaupt, Larry Ribstein, Lynn Stout, and participants at workshops at New York University, the University of Connecticut, and Emory University, colloquia at …
Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Common Challenges Facing Shareholder Suits In Europe And The United States, Randall Thomas, James D. Cox
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Episodic and even sometimes systematic misbehavior by businessmen and corporate entities is ubiquitous. While Enron and WorldCom were the battle cries for corporate reform in the U.S. so it was with Ahold and Parmalat across Europe. No country is free of concern that company officers will misbehave thereby injuring investors, consumers and destroying shareholder value. Thus, this symposium issue collects the recent experiences across Europe in strengthening shareholder suits. Most recent legislative efforts in Europe, and hence the comments in the symposium, are focused on the derivative suit. Just as the American experience with class actions, reviewed separately in this …
Corporate Voting, Paul H. Edelman, Robert B. Thompson
Corporate Voting, Paul H. Edelman, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Discussion of shareholder voting frequently begins against a background of the democratic expectations and justifications present in decision-making in the public sphere. Directors are assumed to be agents of the shareholders in much the same way that public officers are representatives of citizens. Recent debates about majority voting and shareholder nomination of directors illustrate this pattern. Yet the corporate process differs in significant ways, partly because the market for shares permits a form of intensity voting and lets markets mediate the outcome in a way that would be foreign to the public setting and partly because the shareholders' role is …