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Full-Text Articles in Law

Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, And The Rule Of Recognition, Matthew D. Adler Jan 2009

Social Facts, Constitutional Interpretation, And The Rule Of Recognition, Matthew D. Adler

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay is a chapter in a volume that examines constitutional law in the United States through the lens of H.L.A. Hart’s “rule of recognition” model of a legal system. My chapter focuses on a feature of constitutional practice that has been rarely examined: how jurists and scholars argue about interpretive methods. Although a vast body of scholarship provides arguments for or against various interpretive methods --such as textualism, originalism, “living constitutionalism,” structure-and-relationship reasoning, representation-reinforcement, minimalism, and so forth -- very little scholarship shifts to the meta-level and asks: What are the considerations that jurists and scholars bring to bear …


Le Concept Hartien D’Obligation Juridique, Stephen Utz Dec 2008

Le Concept Hartien D’Obligation Juridique, Stephen Utz

Stephen Gerard Utz

La tentative de H. L. A. Hart à démontrer qu’on peut distinguer des systèmes
juridiques d’autres assemblages de règles sans recourir aux normes morales et,
ainsi de réfuter la doctrine de la loi naturelle, semble supposer la dichotomie fait/
valeur dans sa formulation la plus extrême. Dans le cadre de son projet, Hart a
proposé une vue de l’obligation juridique qui a exercé une influence même sur
ceux qui ont des doutes quant au projet principal de Hart. Ce rapport essaie
de soutenir  qu’une  version moins extrême de la dichotomie fait/valeur aurait
dispensé Hart de défendre une thèse de l’obligation …