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Articles 1 - 4 of 4

Full-Text Articles in Law

Professor Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. September 22, 1937 - December 11, 2008, Hon. Walter S. Felton Jr. Nov 2009

Professor Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. September 22, 1937 - December 11, 2008, Hon. Walter S. Felton Jr.

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Professor Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.: Tending To His Flock To Improve Its Lot, John P. Cunningham Nov 2009

Professor Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.: Tending To His Flock To Improve Its Lot, John P. Cunningham

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


A New Look At Judicial Impact: Attorney's Fees In Securities Class Actions After Goldberger V. Integrated Resources, Inc., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Michael A. Perino Jan 2009

A New Look At Judicial Impact: Attorney's Fees In Securities Class Actions After Goldberger V. Integrated Resources, Inc., Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, Michael A. Perino

Faculty Publications

Political scientists have long been interested in what impact judicial decisions have on their intended audiences. Compliance has been defined as the lower court's proper application of standards the superior court has enunciated in deciding all cases raising similar or related questions. Most studies find widespread compliance in lower courts, with only rare instances of overt defiance.

This Article attempts to address three questions in the extant judicial impact literature. First, existing studies use rather insensitive measures of compliance and thus may fail to identify instances of subtle resistance to higher court rulings. Second, judicial impact literature has a restrained …


Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar Jan 2009

Representation Reinforcement: A Legislative Solution To A Legislative Process Problem, Anita S. Krishnakumar

Faculty Publications

One of the most valuable—and disturbing—insights offered by public choice theory has been the recognition that wealthy, well-organized interests with narrow, intense preferences often dominate the legislative process while diffuse, unorganized interests go under-represented. Responding to this insight, legal scholars in the fields of statutory interpretation and administrative law have suggested that the solution to the problem of representational inequality lies with the courts. Indeed, over the past two decades, scholars in these fields have offered up a host of John Hart Ely-inspired representation reinforcing "canons of construction," designed to encourage judges to use their role as statutory interpreters to …