Law Commons^™

Trustworthiness As A Limitation On Network Neutrality, Aaron J. Burstein, Fred B. Schneider

Federal Communications Law Journal

The policy debate over how to govern access to broadband networks has largely ignored the objective of network trustworthiness-a set of properties (including security, survivability, and safety) that guarantee expected behavior. Instead, the terms of the network access debate have focused on whether imposing a nondiscrimination or "network neutrality" obligation on network providers is justified by the condition of competition among last-mile providers. Rules proposed by scholars and policymakers would allow network providers to deviate from network neutrality to protect network trustworthiness, but none of these proposals has explored the implications of such exceptions for either neutrality or trustworthiness.

This …

Comments Of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions To Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants, Jonathan Baker, William Baumol, Kenneth Arrow, Susan Athey, Coleman Bazelon, Timothy Brennan, Timothy Bresnahan, Jeremy Bulow, Yeon-Koo Che, Peter Cramton, Daniel Ackerberg, James Alleman, Gregory Crawford, Peter Demarzo, Gerald Faulhaber, Jeremy Fox, Ian Gale, Jacob Goeree, Brent Goldfarb, Shane Greenstein, Robert Hahn, Robert Hall, Ward Hanson, Barry Harris, Robert Harris, Janice Hauge, Jerry Hausman, Thomas Hazlett, Kenneth Hendricks, Heather Hudson, Mark Jamison, John Kagel, Alfred Kahn, Ilan Kremer, Vijay Krishna, William Lehr, Thomas Lenard, Jonathan Levin, Yuanchuan Lien, John Mayo, David Mcadams, Paul Milgrom, Roger Noll, Bruce Owen, Charles Plott, Robert Porter, Philip Reny, Michael Riordan, David Salant, Scott Savage, William Samuelson, Richard Schmalensee, Marius Schwartz, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Vernon Smith, Daniel Vincent, Joel Waldfogel, Scott Wallsten, Robert Weber, Bradley Wimmer, Glenn Woroch, Lixin Ye, John Hayes, Gregory Rosston

Congressional and Other Testimony

The signatories to this document are economists who have studied telecommunications, auctions, and competition policy. While we may disagree about the stimulus package, we believe that it is important to implement mechanisms that make stimulus spending as efficient as possible. To that end, we have come together to encourage the National Telecommunications Information Agency (NTIA) and Rural Utilities Service (RUS) to adopt auction mechanisms to allocate broadband stimulus grants.The broadband stimulus NOI asks which mechanisms NTIA and RUS should use to distribute grants and how those mechanisms address shortcomings in traditional grant and loan programs. In this note we explain …

Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation And The Problem With Pricing: An Empirical, Cautionary Tale, Babette E.L. Boliek

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

I present here a unique empirical analysis of the consumer welfare benefits of prior regulation in the mobile telecommunications industry. In particular, I analyze the relative consumer benefits of state rate regulation and federal entry regulation. The institution of filing requirements and FTC review and approval of various consumer pricing regimes is highly analogous to the consumer price controls imposed by various state level public utility commissions in the past. Furthermore, the imposition of a zero-price rule is analogous to past rate regulation; in particular it is similar to past wholesale regulation with its underlying principles of open access and …

Fcc Jurisdiction Over Isps In Protocol-Specific Bandwidth Throttling, Andrew Gioia

Michigan Telecommunications & Technology Law Review

Over the past decade, the Internet has matured from its dial-up infancy into the nation's dominant communications infrastructure. Such rapid growth and accessibility--while fostering free speech and innovation like nothing before--has nonetheless created complex regulatory and policy questions for both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the cable companies providing the nation's broadband Internet access. For instance, Comcast, one such Internet provider, has recently brought to the fore the question of how, and to what extent, the FCC can ensure an open and accessible Internet through the company's recent actions in selectively targeting and interfering with the connections of certain …

The Need For Better Analysis Of High Capacity Services, George S. Ford, Lawrence J. Spiwak

GEORGE S FORD

In 1999, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) began to grant incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) pricing flexibility on special access services in some Metropolitan Statistical Areas (“MSAs”) when specific evidence of competitive alternatives is present. The propriety of that deregulatory move by the FCC has been criticized by the purchasers of such services ever since. Proponents of special access price regulation rely on three central arguments to support a retreat to strict price regulation: (1) the market(s) for special access and similar services is unduly concentrated; (2) rates of return on special access services, computed using FCC ARMIS data, are …