Law Commons^™

The Neoclassical Crisis In U.S. Competition Policy, 1890-1960, Herbert Hovenkamp

Herbert Hovenkamp

ABSTRACT The development of marginalist, or neoclassical, economics led to a fifty-year long crisis in competition policy. Given an industrial structure with sufficient fixed costs, competition always became "ruinous," forcing firms to cut prices to marginal cost without sufficient revenue remaining to pay off investment. Early neoclassicists such as Alfred Marshall were not able to solve this problem. As a result many early twentieth century economists were hostile toward the antitrust laws. The ruinous competition debate came to an abrupt end in the early 1930's, when economists Joan Robinson in Great Britain and particularly Edward Chamberlin in the United States …

Due Process And Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

This paper sets out a public choice (rent-seeking) theory of the Due Process Clause, which implies that the function of the clause is to prevent takings through the legislative or common law process. This view of the clause's function supports a preference for expanding rather than contracting the set of entitlements protected by the clause. The Supreme Court's application of due process reasoning in the punitive damages case law is in some respects consistent and in other respects inconsistent with this theory. For the most part, the Court has failed to develop a set of doctrines that would enable lower …

Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case Of Property Rights In Road Traffic Management, Jonathan R. Nash

Faculty Articles

This Article argues, using the case of responses to traffic con­gestion, that public choice theory provides a greater explanation for the emergence of property rights than does economic efficiency. The tradi­tional solution to traffic congestion is to provide new roadway capacity, but that is not an efficient response in that it does not lead to internaliza­tion of costs and may actually exacerbate congestion problems by induc­ing travel that would not have taken place but for the new construction. By contrast, congestion charges, which impose tolls designed to internal­ize the costs of driving, offer an efficient way to address the problem …

An Empirical Examination Of Product And Litigant-Specific Theories For The Divergence Between Nafta Chapter 19 And U.S. Judicial Review, Juscelino F. Colares

Faculty Publications

Empirical analysis of NAFTA panel review has shown that panels reverse US agency trade remedy determinations twice as often as US courts. Recent studies have eliminated case selection and other hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence. In this article, Probit regressions show that case docket differences, such as type of import or litigant identity, also cannot account for this discrepancy. As NAFTA panels must apply the same law and standards of review as the US courts they replace, this divergence presents serious questions regarding US Congressional acquiescence to the operation of NAFTA panels and encourages discussion of the role …

Authorizing Subnational Constitutions In Transitional Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, And The Kwazulu- Natal Constitution, Jonathan Marshfield

Jonathan Marshfield