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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett
Insource The Shareholding Of Outsourced Employees: A Global Stock Ownership Plan, Robert C. Hockett
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
With the American economy stalled and another federal election campaign season well underway, the “outsourcing” of American jobs is again on the public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that claims for joblessness benefits are up, but also that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled since the last electoral cycle. This year’s political candidates have been quick to take note. In consequence, more than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American participation in the World Trade Organization, in the North American Free Trade Agreement, and in the processes of global economic integration more generally appear …
An Overview Of Brazilian Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho, Érica Gorga
An Overview Of Brazilian Corporate Governance, Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson De Carvalho, Érica Gorga
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
We provide the first detailed picture of firm-level corporate governance practices in an emerging market. We report on the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies. Most firms have a controlling shareholder or group. Board independence is an area of weakness. The boards of most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many firms have no independent directors. Financial disclosure is a second area of weakness. Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or …
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge V. Ford, Lynn A. Stout
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge V. Ford, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
What is the purpose of a corporation? To many people, the answer to this question seems obvious: corporations exist to make money for their shareholders. Maximizing shareholder wealth is the corporation's only true concern, its raison d'être. Devoted corporate officers and directors should direct all their efforts toward this goal.
Some find this picture of the corporation as an engine for increasing shareholder wealth to be quite attractive. Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman famously praised this view of corporate purpose in his 1970 New York Times essay, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." To others, the …
Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout
Fiduciary Duties For Activist Shareholders, Iman Anabtawi, Lynn A. Stout
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporations, while shareholders play only a weak and passive role. As a result, corporate officers and directors are understood to be subject to extensive fiduciary duties, while shareholders traditionally have been thought to have far more limited obligations. Outside the contexts of controlling shareholders and closely held firms, many experts argue shareholders have no duties at all.
The most important trend in corporate governance today, however, is the move toward "shareholder democracy." Changes in financial markets, in business practice, and in corporate law have given minority shareholders in public …
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead, Ronald J. Gilson
Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, And Complete Capital Markets, Charles K. Whitehead, Ronald J. Gilson
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
The traditional law and finance focus on agency costs presumes that the premise that diversified public shareholders are the cheapest risk bearers is immutable. In this Essay, we raise the possibility that changes in the capital markets have called this premise into question, drawn into sharp relief by the recent private equity wave in which the size and range of public companies being taken private expanded significantly. In brief, we argue that private owners, in increasingly complete markets, can transfer risk in discrete slices to counterparties who, in turn, can manage or otherwise diversify away those risks they choose to …