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Full-Text Articles in Law
Bankruptcy Vérité, Lynn M. Lopucki, Joseph W. Doherty
Bankruptcy Vérité, Lynn M. Lopucki, Joseph W. Doherty
Michigan Law Review
In the empirical study we report in Bankruptcy Fire Sales, we compared the recoveries from the going-concern bankruptcy sales of twenty-five large, public companies with the recoveries from the bankruptcy reorganizations of thirty large, public companies. We found that, controlling for the asset size of the company and its presale or pre-reorganization earnings ("EBITDA"), reorganization recoveries were more than double sale recovenes. We are honored that Professor James J. White has chosen to comment on our study. White is an eloquent defender of the status quo, pulls no punches, and always has something interesting to say. Bankruptcy Noir is …
Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study Of Consumer Debtors, Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, Elizabeth Warren
Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study Of Consumer Debtors, Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A. E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, Elizabeth Warren
Articles
Before 2005, many people went broke and many filed for bankruptcy. After 2005, many people still go broke, but not so many file for bankruptcy. Why has the number of bankruptcies declined? Surely it is not the economy. All throughout the 2000s, families have been under increasing economic pressure. Median family incomes have declined, basic expenses have risen, and families are shouldering unprecedented debt loads. Defaults remain high for credit cards and car loans, while mortgage foreclosures have soared. By 2008, over half of all Americans reported that their incomes were falling behind their cost of living. These data all …
Bankruptcy Noir, James J. White
Bankruptcy Noir, James J. White
Articles
In Bankruptcy Fire Sales, Professor LoPucki and Dr. Doherty do two things. First, they present provocative data about the relative payoff to be had in Chapter 11 by a full reorganization compared with the payoff from a section 363 sale without a full reorganization. Second, they give a yet more provocative explanation for their data. Taking a page from Professor LoPucki's recent book, they blame the meager return that they observe on 363 sales on the unprincipled behavior of the lawyers, managers, creditors, investment bankers, and even judges involved in the sales. Messrs. LoPucki and Doherty's data appear to …