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Full-Text Articles in Law

Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion And Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, Sherry F. Colb Feb 2007

Standing Room Only: Why Fourth Amendment Exclusion And Standing Can No Longer Logically Coexist, Sherry F. Colb

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Tied Up In Knotts? Gps And The Fourth Amendment, Renee Mcdonald Hutchins Jan 2007

Tied Up In Knotts? Gps And The Fourth Amendment, Renee Mcdonald Hutchins

Journal Articles

Judicial and scholarly assessment of emerging technology seems poised to drive the Fourth Amendment down one of three paths. The first would simply relegate the amendment to a footnote in history books by limiting its reach to harms that the framers specifically envisioned. A modified version of this first approach would dispense with expansive constitutional notions of privacy and replace them with legislative fixes. A third path offers the amendment continued vitality but requires the U.S. Supreme Court to overhaul its Fourth Amendment analysis. Fortunately, a fourth alternative is available to cabin emerging technologies within the existing doctrinal framework. Analysis …


Tied Up In Knotts? Gps Technology And The Fourth Amendment, Renée Mcdonald Hutchins Jan 2007

Tied Up In Knotts? Gps Technology And The Fourth Amendment, Renée Mcdonald Hutchins

Faculty Scholarship

Judicial and scholarly assessment of emerging technology seems poised to drive the Fourth Amendment down one of three paths. The first would simply relegate the amendment to a footnote in history books by limiting its reach to harms that the framers specifically envisioned. A modified version of this first approach would dispense with expansive constitutional notions of privacy and replace them with legislative fixes. A third path offers the amendment continued vitality but requires the U.S. Supreme Court to overhaul its Fourth Amendment analysis. Fortunately, a fourth alternative is available to cabin emerging technologies within the existing doctrinal framework. Analysis …


The Liberal Assault On The Fourth Amendment, Christopher Slobogin Jan 2007

The Liberal Assault On The Fourth Amendment, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

As construed by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement regulates overt, non-regulatory government searches of homes, cars, and personal effects-and virtually nothing else. This essay is primarily about how we got to this point. It is fashionable to place much of the blame for today's law on the Warren Court's adoption of the malleable expectation of privacy concept as the core value protected by the Fourth Amendment. But this diagnosis fails to explain why even the more liberal justices have often gone along with many of the privacy-diminishing holdings of the Court. This essay argues that three other …


There Is No Place Like Home: The Supreme Court's Refusal To Allow Searches Of The Home Based On Disputed Consent In Georgia V. Randolph, Kyle Evans Jan 2007

There Is No Place Like Home: The Supreme Court's Refusal To Allow Searches Of The Home Based On Disputed Consent In Georgia V. Randolph, Kyle Evans

Oklahoma Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Technology Of Surveillance: Will The Supreme Court's Expectations Ever Resemble Society's?, Stephen E. Henderson Dec 2006

The Technology Of Surveillance: Will The Supreme Court's Expectations Ever Resemble Society's?, Stephen E. Henderson

Stephen E Henderson

For law students studying criminal procedure—or at least for those cramming for the exam—it becomes a mantra: government conduct only implicates the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches if it invades a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” This is not the contemporary definition of the word “search,” nor was it the definition at the time of the founding. But, via a well-intentioned concurrence by Justice Harlan in the famous 1967 case of Katz v. United States, it became the Court’s definition.
This lack of fealty to the English language left some questions. For example, is determining whether someone has a “reasonable …


Beyond The (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, And The Rest Of Us Too, Stephen E. Henderson Dec 2006

Beyond The (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, And The Rest Of Us Too, Stephen E. Henderson

Stephen E Henderson

For at least thirty years the Supreme Court has adhered to its third-party doctrine in interpreting the Fourth Amendment, meaning that so far as a disclosing party is concerned, information in the hands of a third party receives no Fourth Amendment protection. The doctrine was controversial when adopted, has been the target of sustained criticism, and is the predominant reason that the Katz revolution has not been the revolution many hoped it would be. Some forty years after Katz the Court's search jurisprudence largely remains tied to property conceptions. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, however, the doctrine is not the …