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Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

2007

Law and Economics

Trade Regulation

BLR

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi Feb 2007

Antitrust Process And Vertical Deference: Judicial Review Of State Regulatory Inaction, Jim Rossi

ExpressO

Courts struggle with the tension between national competition laws, on the one hand, and state and local regulation, on the other – especially as traditional governmental functions are privatized and as economic regulation advances beyond its traditional role to address market monitoring. This Article defends a process-based account of the state action antitrust exception against alternative interpretations, such as the substantive efficiency preemption approach recently advanced by Richard Squire, and elaborates on what such a process-based account would entail for courts addressing the role of state economic regulation as a defense in antitrust cases. It recasts the debate as focused …


Culture, Sovereignty, And Hollywood: Unesco And The Future Of Trade In Cultural Products, Christopher M. Bruner Feb 2007

Culture, Sovereignty, And Hollywood: Unesco And The Future Of Trade In Cultural Products, Christopher M. Bruner

ExpressO

On October 20, 2005, the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted a treaty – by a vote of 148-2, with 4 abstentions – that legitimates domestic legal measures aimed at the protection of local producers of "cultural activities, goods and services." Opposed by the United States and Israel, the Convention represents a major diplomatic victory for Canada and France – its principal proponents – and a major blow to Hollywood and the United States, audiovisual products being among America's most lucrative exports. Both Canada and France, like many countries around the world, have …


When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry Jan 2007

When Second Comes First: Correcting Patent’S Poor Secondary Incentives Through An Optional Patent Purchase System, Jordan Barry

ExpressO

As research has advanced, technologies have become more closely knit, and the relationships between them—both complementary and competitive—have become increasingly important. Unfortunately, the patent system’s use of monopoly power to reward innovators creates inefficient results by overly encouraging the development of substitute technologies and discouraging the development of complementary technologies. This paper explains how an optional patent purchase system could help ameliorate such problems and discusses the implications of such a system.