Law Commons^™

Cross-Monitoring And Corporate Governance, Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung, Albert H. Yoon

Faculty Scholarship

We take the view that corporate governance must involve more than corporate law. Despite corporate scholars' nearly exclusive focus on corporate law mechanisms for controlling managerial agency costs, shareholders are not the only constituency concerned with such costs. Given the thick web of firms' contractual commitments, it should not be a surprise that other financial claimants may also attempt to control agency costs in their contracts with the firm. We hypothesize that this cross-monitoring by other claimants has value for shareholders.

We examine bank loans for empirical evidence of the value of cross-monitoring. Our approach builds on prior empirical work …

The Role Of Financial Journalists In Corporate Governance, Michael J. Borden

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Director Compliance With Elusive Fiduciary Duties In A Climate Of Corporate Governance Reform, Nadelle Grossman

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles Of Cross-Border Legal Frameworks In A Globalized World Balancing Rights With Responsibilities, Joseph E. Stiglitz

American University International Law Review

No abstract provided.

Sarbanes-Oxley: The Delaware Perspective, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.