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Full-Text Articles in Law
A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
A Contractarian Argument Against The Death Penalty, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
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Opponents of the death penalty typically base their opposition on contingent features of its administration, arguing that the death penalty is applied discriminatory, that the innocent are sometimes executed, or that there is insufficient evidence of the death penalty’s deterrent efficacy. Implicit in these arguments is the suggestion that if these contingencies did not obtain, serious moral objections to the death penalty would be misplaced. In this Article, Professor Finkelstein argues that there are grounds for opposing the death penalty even in the absence of such contingent factors. She proceeds by arguing that neither of the two prevailing theories of …
Hobbes And The Internal Point Of View, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
Hobbes And The Internal Point Of View, Claire Oakes Finkelstein
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No abstract provided.
Hart On Social Rules And The Foundations Of Law: Liberating The Internal Point Of View, Stephen R. Perry
Hart On Social Rules And The Foundations Of Law: Liberating The Internal Point Of View, Stephen R. Perry
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No abstract provided.
Government Regulation Of Irrationality: Moral And Cognitive Hazards, Jonathan Klick, Gregory Mitchell
Government Regulation Of Irrationality: Moral And Cognitive Hazards, Jonathan Klick, Gregory Mitchell
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Behavioral law and economics scholars who advance paternalistic policy proposals typically employ static models of decision-making behavior, despite the dynamic effects of paternalistic policies. This Article considers how paternalistic policies fare under a dynamic account of decision making that incorporates learning and motivation effects. This approach brings out two important limitations on the efficiency effects of paternalistic regulations. First, if preferences and biases are endogenous to institutional forces, paternalistic government regulations may perpetuate and even magnify a given bias and cause other adverse psychological effects. Second, for some biases, it will be more efficient to invest resources in debiasing than …