Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Reputation And International Law, Andrew Guzman Dec 2005

Reputation And International Law, Andrew Guzman

Andrew T Guzman

Among the reasons that states comply with international law in the absence of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a concern for their reputation for compliance with international legal rules. Such a reputation is valuable because it allows states to make credible commitments to one another in an effort to overcome problems of cooperation. To date neither the international relations nor the international law literature has developed a theory of reputation that explains in detail how states acquire a reputation for compliance, how they lose it, and how it affects behavior. This paper seeks to provide such a theory. It examines how …


The Promise Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman Dec 2005

The Promise Of International Law, Andrew T. Guzman

Andrew T Guzman

In their recent book, The Limits of International Law, Professors Goldsmith and Posner throw down the gauntlet to scholars of international law. They advance a deeply pessimistic account of international law and its role in affecting state behavior -- alleging that customary international fails to act as “an exogenous influence on states’ behavior,” and expressing skepticism that multinational collective action problems can be solved by treaty. This review represents a response to the book’s claims. It is demonstrated that there is no theoretical reason to conclude that international law is ineffective, whether it addresses bilateral or multilateral problems and whether …


Competing For Capital: The Diffusion Of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, Andrew T. Guzman Dec 2005

Competing For Capital: The Diffusion Of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, Andrew T. Guzman

Andrew T Guzman

Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign direct investment. The proliferation of BITs during the past two decades in particular has been phenomenal. These intergovernmental treaties typically grant extensive rights to foreign investors, including protection of contractual rights and the right to international arbitration in the event of an investment dispute. How can we explain the widespread adoption of BITs? We argue that the spread of BITs is driven by international competition among potential host countries—typically developing countries—for foreign direct investment. We propose …