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The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard Form Contracts Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason S. Johnston
The Return Of Bargain: An Economic Theory Of How Standard Form Contracts Negotiation Between Businesses And Consumers, Jason S. Johnston
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This paper analyzes standard form contracts between firms and individual consumers (and borrowers). It presents a mix of anecdotal and empirical evidence from a large number of industries demonstrating a widespread pattern in which firms refrain from enforcing the typically clear bright line performance obligations that such standard form contracts set out (such as a consumer credit repayment terms, or a retail consumer's right to return goods). Instead, firms routinely give their supervisory employees the discretion to bargain around such terms. Within a simple and informal model, the paper explains such delegated, discretionary renegotiation as a means by which firms …
Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande
Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts?, Robert H. Lande
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The purpose of this commentary is to analyze some of the empirical issues that help lay the foundation for the policy conclusions in the excellent and provocative article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and Exclusion (hereinafter "D&E"). To oversimplify, D&E asserts that discounts usually are procompetitive. It also concedes, but essentially in its footnotes, that discounts can be anticompetitive, but argues that these anticompetitive situations are so rare they should have little impact on public policy. D&E then asserts that efficiencies from discounts are common and significant. It then asserts that the only way to bring clarity, predictability, and an …
The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
The Size Of Cartel Overcharges: Implications For U.S. And Ec Fining Policies, John M. Connor, Robert H. Lande
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The purpose of this article is to examine whether the current cartel fine levels of the European Union (EU) and the United States are at the optimal levels. We collected and analyzed the available information concerning the size of the overcharges caused by hard-core pricing fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation agreements. Data sets of United States cartels were assembled and examined. These cartels overcharged an average of 18% to 37%, depending upon the data set and methodology employed in the analysis and whether mean or median figures are used. Separate data sets for European cartels also were analyzed, which …
Comments On Stealth Marketing And Editorial Integrity, R. Polk Wagner
Comments On Stealth Marketing And Editorial Integrity, R. Polk Wagner
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No abstract provided.