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Warping The Rules: How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules To Exclude Polygraph Evidence, John C. Bush Mar 2006

Warping The Rules: How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules To Exclude Polygraph Evidence, John C. Bush

Vanderbilt Law Review

Polygraph tests rely on the hypothesis that a subject's body yields physiologically different symptoms if he or she is lying.' When a polygraph test is administered, a mechanical apparatus records the subject's physiological changes, and the polygrapher conducting the examination interprets the data. The techniques for measuring physiological changes vary in their foci, which may include respiration, blood pressure, cardiovascular function, and skin resistance. The polygraph apparatus records changes to one or more of these foci, and a technician, or polygrapher, then analyzes the results to conclude whether the subject has been truthful.

Polygraph results factor into choices ranging from …


Should Judges Do Independent Research On Scientific Issues?, Edward K. Cheng Jan 2006

Should Judges Do Independent Research On Scientific Issues?, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Judges are deeply divided about the issue of independent research, which goes to the heart of their roles and responsibilities in the legal system. To many judges, doing independent research when confronted with new and unfamiliar material seems the most responsible and natural thing to do. To others, it represents the worst kind of overreaching and a threat to long-cherished adversarial values. But whether one supports the practice or not, one thing is clear. The issue of independent research deserves far greater attention than it has so far from jurists, academics, and practitioners alike.


Dangerousness And Expertise Redux, Christopher Slobogin Jan 2006

Dangerousness And Expertise Redux, Christopher Slobogin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Civil commitment, confinement under sexual predator laws, and many capital and noncapital sentences depend upon proof of a propensity toward violence. This Article discusses the current state of prediction science, in particular the advantages and disadvantages of clinical and actuarial prediction, and then analyzes how the rules of evidence should be interpreted in deciding whether opinions about propensity should be admissible. It concludes that dangerousness predictions that are not based on empirically derived probability estimates should be excluded from the courtroom unless the defense decides otherwise. This conclusion is not bottomed on the usual concern courts and commentators raise about …


A Study Of Juror Expectations And Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does The "Csi Effect" Exist?, Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim, Gregg Barak Jan 2006

A Study Of Juror Expectations And Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does The "Csi Effect" Exist?, Hon. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim, Gregg Barak

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This article is the first empirical study of jurors designed to investigate the existence and extent of the "CSI effect." The authors conducted a survey of 1027 persons who had been called for jury duty in a Michigan state court during a nine-week period in June, July and August, 2006. This survey examined the summoned jurors' demographic information, television viewing habits, their expectations that the prosecutor would produce scientific evidence and whether they would demand scientific evidence as a condition of a guilty verdict.

This study of juror expectations and demands about scientific evidence in relationship to other types of …


Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng Jan 2006

Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past And Present, Edward K. Cheng

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

For over twenty years, and particularly since the Supreme Court's Daubert' decision in 1993, much ink has been spilled debating the problem of scientific evidence in the courts. Are jurors or, in the alternative, judges qualified to assess scientific reliability? Do courts really need to be concerned about "junk science"? What mechanisms can promote better decision making in scientific cases? Even a cursory scan of the literature shows the recent explosion of interest in these issues, precipitating new treatises, hundreds of articles, and countless conferences for judges, practitioners, and academics.