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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Law
The New Constitutional Order And The Heartening Of Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, James E. Fleming
The New Constitutional Order And The Heartening Of Conservative Constitutional Aspirations, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
The basic question for this conference is whether we as a people have entered, or are on the verge of entering, a new constitutional order. In 2003, Mark Tushnet published a terrific book, The New Constitutional Order, an expansion of his insightful Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Ambition in the Harvard Law Review.2 The title of that book was an inspiration for the title of this conference. And the title of that article is the basis for the title of my article. For years, liberals and progressives have been anticipating or announcing a conservative revolution …
Brief Amicus Curiae Of Professors Keith N. Hylton, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Mark F. Grady, Jeffrey L. Harrison, Mark G. Kelman, And Thomas Ulen In Support Of Respondents In Philip Morris Usa V. Mayola Williams, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
There is no dispute that the punitive damages award that was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court in this case satisfies the most rigorous law and economic standards for rationality. The Court need not credit the analysis of the undersigned amici on this score; the fact that Petitioner’s own amici – most notably law and economics scholars A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell – have been unable to find anything economically amiss in the decision below speaks volumes. To be sure, Professors Polinsky and Shavell have filed an amicus brief in support of Philip Morris in this case, just as …
Representative Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court As A Representative Body, Angela Onwuachi-Willig
Representative Government, Representative Court? The Supreme Court As A Representative Body, Angela Onwuachi-Willig
Faculty Scholarship
In this Symposium Essay, I propose, as a thinking matter, that we expand the number of Supreme Court justices to increase the representation of various demographic groups on the Court. In Part I, I advance the argument that the Court should be regarded as a demographically representative body of the citizens of the United States, and in Part II, I argue that the Court should be enlarged to ensure diverse representation of all voices on the most powerful judicial body of our nation.
'There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause': An Appreciation Of Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, James E. Fleming
'There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause': An Appreciation Of Justice Stevens's Equal Protection Jurisprudence, James E. Fleming
Faculty Scholarship
"There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases."1 These words open Justice John Paul Stevens's famous concurring opinion in Craig v. Boren.2 That was the first case in which the U.S. Supreme Court applied "intermediate" scrutiny to gender-based classifications and thus carved out a third tier of equal protection analysis between strict scrutiny and deferential rational basis scrutiny. Craig was decided in 1976, at the beginning of Justice Stevens's long and distinguished …
Jackson V. Birmingham Board Of Education: Title Ix's Implied Private Right Of Action For Retaliation, Elizabeth Mccuskey
Jackson V. Birmingham Board Of Education: Title Ix's Implied Private Right Of Action For Retaliation, Elizabeth Mccuskey
Faculty Scholarship
The Supreme Court has penned countless words about the sound of statutory silence.' On March 29, 2005, the Court once again grappled with the meaning of silence in a statute, splitting along familiar 5-4 lines in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education.2 When the dust cleared, a male coach of a high school girls' basketball team, who was fired in retaliation for protecting his players' Title IX3 rights, possessed a private right of action arising from the statute itself.4 Although the Court has retreated from its high-water mark of implying private rights of action,5 in …