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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006: A Welcome—And Needed—Change, Dale M. Cendali, Bonnie L. Schriefer
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act Of 2006: A Welcome—And Needed—Change, Dale M. Cendali, Bonnie L. Schriefer
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Some have argued that the changes to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the “FTDA”) embodied in the recently enacted Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (the “TDRA”) threaten to infringe upon the right to free speech. This is simply not the case. The FTDA has always protected First Amendment rights, and the TDRA clarifies and strengthens those protections. While the concept of dilution was introduced in 1927, there was no federal dilution law in the United States until 1995, when Congress passed the FTDA. Since then, various federal courts have reached different conclusions regarding issues such as: (1) what constituted …
The Dilution Solution: Populating The Trademark A-List, Scott C. Wilcox
The Dilution Solution: Populating The Trademark A-List, Scott C. Wilcox
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In our celebrity-conscious culture, the media serve as arbiters of fame. The editors of Us Weekly and People wield significant influence over public recognition of celebrities. Since the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) amended the Lanham Act in 1995, federal courts have adopted similar roles as arbiters of fame, determining which trademarks are sufficiently famous to receive federal protection against dilution. Recent changes to the Lanham Act, however, reserve the availability of dilution actions to “A-list” marks. These changes fulfill the objectives of trademark law while achieving Congress’s intent in enacting the FTDA.
What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan
What Is Dilution, Anyway?, Stacey L. Dogan
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. in 2003, an amendment to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”) has appeared inevitable. Congress almost certainly meant to adopt a “likelihood of dilution” standard in the original statute, and the 2006 revisions correct its sloppy drafting. Substituting a “likelihood of dilution” standard for “actual dilution,” however, does not resolve a deeper philosophical question that has always lurked in the dilution debate: what is dilution, and how does one prove or disprove its probability? The statutory definition notwithstanding, this issue remains largely unanswered, leaving the courts with the …
The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall
The High Court Remains As Divided As Ever Over The Death Penalty, George H. Kendall
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
More than three decades ago, in Furman v. Georgia, a sharply divided Supreme Court struck down all existing capital punishment schemes be-cause the results they generated were arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasoned. No member of that Court remains on the Court today, and the Court has grown increasingly conservative ever since. Nevertheless, impor-tant questions concerning the administration of capital punishment continue to wrought deep divisions within the Court, for instance in determining whether racial bias influences the system, in determining the sufficiency of new evidence of innocence to justify review of a defaulted claim in habeas corpus proceedings, in determining a …
Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman
Legitimizing Error, Rebecca E. Woodman
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Since Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court has sought to harmonize competing constitutional demands under Eighth Amendment rules regulat-ing the two-step eligibility and selection stages of the capital decision-making process. Furman’s demand for rationality and consistency requires that, at the eligibility stage, the sentencer’s discretion be limited and guided by clear and objective fact-based standards that rationally narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. The selection stage requires a determination of whether a specific death-eligible defendant actually deserves that punish-ment, as distinguished from other death-eligible defendants. Here, fundamental fairness and respect for the uniqueness of the individual are the cornerstones of …
Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman
Stevens's Ratchet: When The Court Should Decide Not To Decide, Joel A. Flaxman
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Hidden underneath the racy death penalty issues in Kansas v. Marsh lurks a seemingly dull procedural issue addressed only in separate opinions by Justices Stevens and Scalia: whether the Court should have heard the case in the first place. As he did in three cases from the Court’s 2005 term, Justice Stevens argued in Marsh that the Court has no legitimate interest in reviewing state court decisions that overprotect federal constitutional rights. Instead, the Supreme Court should exercise its certiorari power to tip the scales against states and in favor of individuals. Granting certiorari in Marsh, Stevens argued, was not …
The Revolution Enters The Court: The Constitutional Significance Of Wrongful Convictions In Contemporary Constitutional Regulation Of The Death Penalty, Jordan Steiker
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Over the last decade, the most important events in American death pen-alty law have occurred outside the courts. The discovery of numerous wrongfully convicted death-sentenced inmates in Illinois led to the most substantial reflection on the American death penalty system since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Former Illinois Governor George Ryan, a Republi-can, first declared a moratorium on executions in 2000 and eventually commuted all 167 inmates on Illinois’s death row in 2003. The events in Illinois reverberated nationwide. Almost overnight, state legislative agendas shifted from expanding or maintaining the prevailing reach of the death penalty to studying its …
Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis
Dilution's (Still) Uncertain Future, Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Mark D. Janis
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Dilution looked to be a potent weapon when Congress introduced it as § 43(c) of the Lanham Act in 1995. Indeed, some observers feared that it would be too potent (and in some contexts, such as cybersquatting, it successfully augmented traditional causes of action). But a series of court decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue opinion, weakened dilution protection so profoundly that what remained wasn’t of much consequence. Congress has recently sought to breathe new life into dilution law, enacting the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”). Some might see this as a …
Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien
Putting The Guesswork Back Into Capital Sentencing, Sean D. O'Brien
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court deemed it “incon-testable” that a death sentence is cruel and unusual if inflicted “by reason of [the defendant’s] race, religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of such prejudices.” Arbitrary and discriminatory patterns in capital sentencing moved the Court to strike down death penalty statutes that required judges or juries to cast thumbs-up or thumbs-down verdicts against offenders found guilty of capi-tal crimes. The issue of innocence was barely a footnote in Furman; the Court’s concerns focused on …