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2006

Contracts

University of Michigan Law School

Consumers

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner Mar 2006

One-Sided Contracts In Competitive Consumer Markets, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Richard A. Posner

Michigan Law Review

The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competitive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imperfections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article.


Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure Of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, Robert A. Hillman Mar 2006

Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure Of E-Standard Terms Backfire?, Robert A. Hillman

Michigan Law Review

A law backfires when it produces results opposite from those its drafters intended. Lots of laws may have backfired. For example, people opposed to hate crimes legislation think that the laws "inflame prejudice rather than eradicate it." The Endangered Species Act, according to some analysts, has helped destroy rather than preserve the creatures listed by the Act. Even consumer protection laws, some believe, increase prices and confuse consumers instead of protecting them. This Article analyzes whether mandatory website disclosure of standard terms, advocated by some as a potential solution to market failures when consumers contract over the Internet, is another …


The Boilerplate Puzzle, Douglas G. Baird Mar 2006

The Boilerplate Puzzle, Douglas G. Baird

Michigan Law Review

The warranty that comes with your laptop computer is one of its many product attributes. The laptop has a screen of a particular size. Its microprocessors work at a particular speed, and the battery lasts a given amount of time between recharging. The hard drive has a certain capacity and mean time to failure. There is an instruction manual, online technical support (or lack thereof), and software. Then there are the warranties that the seller makes (or does not make) that are also part of the bundle. Just as I know the size of the screen, but nothing about the …


The Hidden Roles Of Boilerplate And Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition Of Transaction Costs, Segmentation Of Consumers, And Anticompetitive Effects, David Gilo, Ariel Porat Mar 2006

The Hidden Roles Of Boilerplate And Standard-Form Contracts: Strategic Imposition Of Transaction Costs, Segmentation Of Consumers, And Anticompetitive Effects, David Gilo, Ariel Porat

Michigan Law Review

Standard-form contracts offered to consumers contain numerous terms and clauses, most of which are ancillary to the main terms of the transaction. We call these ancillary terms "boilerplate provisions." Since most consumers do not read boilerplate provisions or, if they do, find them hard to understand, courts are suspicious of boilerplate provisions and sometimes find them unenforceable under the doctrine of unconscionability. At times, courts conclude that harsh terms have not been accepted by consumers in the first place and therefore are not included in the contract, and on other occasions courts interpret boilerplate provisions in favor of consumers, applying …


Contra Proferentem: The Allure Of Ambiguous Boilerplate, Michelle E. Boardman Mar 2006

Contra Proferentem: The Allure Of Ambiguous Boilerplate, Michelle E. Boardman

Michigan Law Review

Bad boilerplate can shake one' s faith in evolution; not only does it not die away, it multiplies. The puzzle is why. Much of boilerplate is ambiguous or incomprehensible. This alienates consumers and is i ncreasingly punished by courts construing the language against the drafter. There must, therefore, be some hidden allure to ambiguous boilerplate. The popular theory is trickery: drafters lure consumers in with promising language that comes to nothing in court. But this trick would require consumers to do three things they do not do-read the language, understand it, and take comfort in it. There is a hidden …