Law Commons^™

Civic Responsibility And Patterns Of Voluntary Participation Around The World, Mary Alice Haddad

Mary Alice Haddad

This article seeks to explain why different types of volunteer organizations are prevalent in different countries. It hypothesizes that patterns of volunteer participation are a function of citizen attitudes toward governmental and individual responsibility for caring for society. Those countries (e.g., Japan)—where citizens think that governments should be responsible for dealing with social problems—will tend to have higher participation in embedded volunteer organizations, such as parent-teacher associations. Those countries (e.g., the United States)—where citizens think that individuals should take responsibility for dealing with social problems—will tend to have more participation in nonembedded, organizations, such as Greenpeace. These hypotheses are tested …

Boyakasha, Fist To Fist: Respect And The Philosophical Link With Reciprocity In International Law And Human Rights, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Sovereignty And The American Courts At The Cocktail Party Of International Law: The Dangers Of Domestic Invocations Of Foreign And International Law, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

With increasing frequency and heightened debate, United States courts have been citing foreign and “international” law as authority for domestic decisions. This trend is inappropriate, undemocratic, and dangerous. The trend touches on fundamental concepts of sovereignty, democracy, the judicial role, and overall issues of effective governance. There are multiple problems with the judiciary’s reliance on extraterritorial and extra-constitutional foreign or international sources to guide their decisions. Perhaps the most fundamental flaw is its interference with rule of law values. To borrow from Judge Harold Levanthal, the use of international sources in judicial decision-making might be described as “the equivalent of …

A Theoretical And Political Analysis Of The Wto Appellate Body, Shoaib A. Ghias

Shoaib A. Ghias

Economic liberalization not only requires rules goveming economic exchange (such as multilateral trade agreements), but also institutions (such as courts) goveming how rules are enforced. However, once courts are established to govem economic exchange, they tend to expand their competence to political and social policy. Political scientists have used this theoretical framework to explain the evolution of national (for example the U.S. Supreme Court) and quasi-intemational (for example the European Court of Justice) judicial institutions. In this article, I explain how this model can be extended to a truly intemational "judicial" institution, the WTO's Appellate Body. In short, the Appellate …