Law Commons^™

The Residency Match: Competitive Restraints In An Imperfect World, Kristin Madison

All Faculty Scholarship

Several years ago physicians filed a lawsuit alleging that “the match,” the more than fifty-year-old system by which medical students and other applicants are assigned to medical residency programs, violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Last year, without hearings or substantive debate on the issue, Congress found that the match was “highly efficient” and “pro-competitive” and granted a retroactive antitrust exemption for its operation. These seemingly incompatible views invite further analysis of the merits of the residency match from the perspective of public policy. This article considers the arguments of match advocates and critics, evaluating both theoretical models and …

An Economic Assessment Of Damage Caps In Medical Malpracitce Litigation Imposed By State Laws And The Implications For Federal Policy And Law, Paul Wazzan

ExpressO

Many states have implemented laws which limit non-economic (e.g., pain and suffering) damages as a result of medical malpractice. These laws are seen by proponents as reducing medical malpractice insurance costs and preserving access to health care – especially for lower income individuals. Opponents believe that individuals are harmed through being prevented from seeking a full measure of redress for medical malpractice incidents, by reducing access to the court system, and that these laws simply enrich insurance companies and doctors.

Federal lawmakers are currently studying the potential effect of uniform medical malpractice damage limits at the national level. It is …

Breaking The Bank: Revisiting Central Bank Of Denver After Enron And Sarbanes-Oxley, Celia Taylor

ExpressO

No abstract provided.

Principles Of Fairness For International Economic Treaties: Constructivism And Contractualism, John Linarelli

ExpressO

No legal system deserving of continued support can exist without an adequate theory of justice. This paper is about the elaboration of a theory of justice to underpin international economic law and international economic institutions. A world trade constitution cannot credibly exist without a clear notion of justice upon which to base a consensus. There is yet no consensus on the public reason underpinning the rules and the institutions. Economic efficiency concepts are widely used in the assessment of the welfare effects of world trade institutions and policies. Efficiency, however, is one of several standards that may be used, but …

Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Gerrit De Geest, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Judges have a tendency to be more demanding than regulators. In the United States, a majority of the courts has adopted the rule that the unexcused violation of a statutory standard is negligence per se. However, the converse does not hold: compliance with regulation does not relieve the injurer of tort liability. In most European legal systems, the outcome is similar. We use a framework in which, on the one hand, the effects of tort law are undermined by insolvency and evidence problems and, on the other hand, regulation is expensive in terms of monitoring and information gathering. We show …

Organizational Misconduct: Beyond The Principal-Agent Model, Kimberly D. Krawiec

ExpressO

This article demonstrates that, at least since the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991, the United States legal regime has been moving away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational liability. Under this system, organizational liability for agent misconduct is dependant on whether or not the organization has exercised due care to avoid the harm in question, rather than under traditional agency principles of respondeat superior. Courts and agencies typically evaluate the level of care exercised by the organization by inquiring whether the organization had in place internal compliance structures ostensibly designed …

Disappearing Defendants V. Judgment Proof Injurers: Upgrading The Theory Of Tort Law Failures, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Barbara Mangan

George Mason University School of Law Working Papers Series

Do injurers’ insolvency and victims’ reluctance to sue affect accident prevention in the same way? Are these circumstances less of a problem under the negligence rule than under strict liability? We argue, contrary to the literature, that the answer is, in most cases, negative and make three main points. First, the judgment proof problem and the disappearing defendant problem are shown to have different effects on injurers’ behavior and hence yield dissimilar levels of social welfare. Second, when these two problems occur simultaneously they may have offsetting effects. Third, the negligence rule is superior to strict liability only under some …