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2004

Administrative law

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Articles 1 - 11 of 11

Full-Text Articles in Law

Looking For Law In China Ii: China’S Legal Reforms After Mao: Accomplishments And Future Prospects, Stanley B. Lubman Oct 2004

Looking For Law In China Ii: China’S Legal Reforms After Mao: Accomplishments And Future Prospects, Stanley B. Lubman

Hong Yen Chang Center for Chinese Legal Studies

In this talk I intend to summarize major accomplishments of Chinese law reform since 1978; and speculate on the future of Chinese law reform

  • In the course of this talk, I will note where China began when legal reform was first undertaken in 1979, and the enormous size and scope of the task that was undertaken.
  • I hope to give an indication both of the progress China has made, and of major obstacles to future reforms;
  • I have chosen one area to emphasize because it may light the way for further meaningful reforms: administrative law
  • I have also noted influences …


Procedural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum Feb 2004

Procedural Justice, Lawrence B. Solum

ExpressO

The real work of procedure is to guide conduct. It is sometimes said that the regulation of primary conduct is the work of the general and abstract norms of substantive law—clauses of the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law rules of tort, property, and contract. But substance cannot effectively guide primary conduct without the aid of procedure. This is true because of three problems: (1) the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. The solution to these problems is particularization by a system of …


Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson Feb 2004

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson

ExpressO

This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.


Toward Normative Rules For Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under The Clean Water Act, Robert R.M. Verchick Jan 2004

Toward Normative Rules For Agency Interpretation: Defining Jurisdiction Under The Clean Water Act, Robert R.M. Verchick

Robert R.M. Verchick

Wetlands advocates, from environmentalists to duck hunters, dodged a bullet last year when the Bush Administration dropped plans to narrow its jurisdiction over streams and wetlands. The decision marked a key chapter in a story that began in 2001, when the Supreme Court invalidated part of the Migratory Bird Rule, a regulation that for many years had supported federal protection over some intrastate wetlands. The Court's broad rejection of this narrow rule sent federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act into a tailspin. The decision opened debates about tributaries and intermittent streams in the Southwest. It also appeared to narrow …


Distributing The Costs Of Environmental, Health, And Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, And Regulatory Reform, David M. Driesen Jan 2004

Distributing The Costs Of Environmental, Health, And Safety Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, And Regulatory Reform, David M. Driesen

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Chevron Deference And Agency Self-Interest, Timothy K. Armstrong Jan 2004

Chevron Deference And Agency Self-Interest, Timothy K. Armstrong

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

Judicial review of a federal administrative agency's statutory or regulatory interpretation ordinarily proceeds under the highly deferential framework announced in the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Withholding an independent judicial interpretation of a statute or regulation in deference to an agency's views, however, poses unique problems when the agency has a self-interested stake in its interpretation - as, for example, when the agency's interpretation affects its regulatory jurisdiction or yields a financial benefit to the agency. A review of several cases in which courts have deferred, or refused to defer, …


Changing Channels And Bridging Divides: The Failure And Redemption Of American Broadcast Television Regulation, Anthony E. Varona Jan 2004

Changing Channels And Bridging Divides: The Failure And Redemption Of American Broadcast Television Regulation, Anthony E. Varona

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

In Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation Professor Varona analyzes how the Supreme Court, Congress and the FCC have defined the legal duties of commercial broadcasters throughout the maturation of the television industry. First, he shows how the public trustee doctrine has failed, with broadcasters today airing very little 'public interest' programming. Second, he examines how and why the FCC has failed to effectively elucidate and enforce the public trustee doctrine, focusing on the irreconcilable First Amendment and commercial tensions inherent in the public trustee doctrine since its inception and the 'capture' …


Settling The Wilderness, Sarah Krakoff Jan 2004

Settling The Wilderness, Sarah Krakoff

Publications

No abstract provided.


The Epa's Risky Reasoning, Cary Coglianese, Gary E. Marchant Jan 2004

The Epa's Risky Reasoning, Cary Coglianese, Gary E. Marchant

All Faculty Scholarship

Regulators must rely on science to understand problems and predict the consequences of regulatory actions, but science by itself cannot justify public policy decisions. We review the Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to justify recent changes to its National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone and particulate matter, showing how the agency was able to cloak its policy judgments under the guise of scientific objectivity. By doing so, the EPA evaded accountability for a shifting and incoherent set of policy positions that will have major implications for public health and the economy. For example, even though EPA claimed to base …


United States V. Bean: Shoveling After The Elephant., Pannal Alan Sanders Jan 2004

United States V. Bean: Shoveling After The Elephant., Pannal Alan Sanders

St. Mary's Law Journal

Over the years Congress has enacted and amended several versions of the United States Code (U.S.C) § 925(c). Several reported cases illustrate the courts’ early efforts to develop a coherent body of jurisprudence with respect to the procedural and substantive aspects of U.S.C. § 925(c) judicial review. Specifically, the § 925(c) denials of relief by the Director before the congressional appropriations ban commenced in 1993. Although the methodology and reasoning behind these decisions differ in their details, several themes are discernable. First, even without the express provisions for judicial review added by the Firearms Owners Protection Act (FOPA), courts consistently …


The Challenge Of Cooperative Regulatory Relations After Enlargement, Francesca Bignami Jan 2004

The Challenge Of Cooperative Regulatory Relations After Enlargement, Francesca Bignami

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

This paper conceptualises European governance as a continuous series of collective action games among national regulators. European administration is theorized as a set of mutually beneficial relations among independent regulators, rather than as a hierarchy of supranational institutions, courts, and national administrators. The collective action approach highlights the importance of certain factors in fostering regulatory cooperation and enabling the common market to become an administrative reality: repeated interactions, monitoring and sanctioning by the Commission and the courts, reciprocity norms, and trust. It also suggests that one of the most significant challenges of enlargement will be to establish cooperative regulatory exchanges …