Law Commons^™

Trumps, Inversions, Balancing, Presumptions, Institution Prompting, And Interpretive Canons: New Ways For Adjudicating Conflicts Between Legal Norms, Carlos E. Gonzalez

Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faculty Papers

This article begins by reviewing the axiomatic principles that govern courts when dealing with cases in which two legal norms are interpreted as standing in conflict. The article then makes three distinct contributions.

First, the article explicates the central justification behind the use and perpetuation of the extant principles. In briefest terms, the extant principles are best justified as an attempt to resolve cases in which legal rules stand in conflict in a way that enhances or preserves the democratic legitimacy of law. They do this by favoring norms created by entities of relatively strong democratic legitimacy over norms created …

Montesquieu's Mistakes And The True Meaning Of Separation, Laurence Claus

University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series

“The political liberty of the subject,” said Montesquieu, “is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety. In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as one man needs not be afraid of another.” The liberty of which Montesquieu spoke is directly promoted by apportioning power among political actors in a way that minimizes opportunities for those actors to determine conclusively the reach of their own powers. Montesquieu’s constitution of liberty is the constitution that most plausibly establishes the rule of law. Montesquieu concluded that this constitution could …

Good Faith In The Cisg: Interpretation Problems In Article 7, Benedict C. Sheehy

ExpressO

ABSTRACT: This article examines the dispute concerning the meaning of Good Faith in the CISG. Although there are good reasons for arguing a more limited interpretation or more limited application of Good Faith, there are also good reasons for a broader approach. Regardless of the correct interpretation, however, practitioners and academics need to have a sense of where the actual jurisprudence is going. This article reviews every published case on Article 7 since its inception and concludes that while there is little to suggest a strong pattern is developing, a guided pattern while incorrect doctrinally is preferable to the current …

Lawyers, Guns And Money: Content Contextualism And The Cognitive Foundations Of Statutory Interpretation, Gary Blasi

ExpressO

The field of statutory interpretation is one of central importance to both lawyers and judges, perhaps even more central to their daily work than the analysis of appellate opinions. As a field of academic inquiry, however, the field has become rather stagnant and seems now at a stalemate between contending schools of thought, with most siding against the pure forms of textualism sometimes associated with Justice Scalia and arguing for some form of contextualism. What kinds of context should matter is disputed. Thus far, however, scholars have paid remarkably little attention to one crucial contextual factor: What is the statute …

The Role Of Purposivism In The Delegation Of Rulemaking Authority To The Courts, Michael Rosensaft

ExpressO

The courts are often used by Congress as a “political lightning rod,” when Congress cannot decide how to resolve an issue. Congress relies on administrative agencies for their expertise, and it also makes sense for Congress to delegate some rulemaking authority to the courts, relying on a court’s expertise in developing caselaw in an incremental basis. However, this authority should not be lightly implied. A court can tell that Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to it when the purpose of the statute is clear and the text is broadly worded. It thus makes sense in these cases that purposivism should …

The Feeney Amendment And The Continuing Rise Of Prosecutorial Power To Plea Bargain, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.