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Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right To A Remedy Under Due Process, Tracy A. Thomas
Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right To A Remedy Under Due Process, Tracy A. Thomas
San Diego Law Review
This essay is part of the 2003 Remedies Forum symposium comprised of international remedies scholars addressing the topic of equitable relief in the fifty years since Brown v. Board of Education. It may be true as other scholars have argued that since the time of Brown, institutional defendants have won at the expense of plaintiffs. Defendants have learned that delay and defiance work. The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a standard for ordering equitable relief that significantly defers to defendant wrongdoers at the plaintiffs' expense. Epithets of activist courts and judicial legislation have colored the existing scholarship and portrayed remedial …
The Jurisdiction Of Justice: Two Conceptions Of Political Morality, Larry Alexander
The Jurisdiction Of Justice: Two Conceptions Of Political Morality, Larry Alexander
San Diego Law Review
My topic in this essay is a major fault line within normative theory. More precisely, it is a major fault line within that part of a normative theory that deals with the content of our moral obligations to others. When I refer to moral obligations here, I am referring to those acts that morality demands of us such that it permits force or its threat to be employed to secure those acts. Moral obligations as I use the term are thus candidates for legal enforcement. I argue that much of what is debated within liberal political/moral theory can be usefully …
"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash
"Is That English You're Speaking?" Why Intention Free Interpretation Is An Impossibility, Larry Alexander, Saikrishna Prakash
San Diego Law Review
"Textualism" is a very general and abstract term that represents a variety of views about the interpretation of legal texts. One strand of textualism is conceptual and descriptive; this strand makes claims about what texts actually mean. Another strand of textualism is normative; this strand makes claims about how judges ought to proceed when they interpret particular kinds of legal texts, such as constitutions and statutes. In the first part of this paper, we are particularly concerned with an especially strong form of conceptual textualism - the position that texts can be interpreted without any reference, express or implied, to …