Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Evaluating The Risks Of Market Swaps, Maurice Stucke Oct 2003

Evaluating The Risks Of Market Swaps, Maurice Stucke

Scholarly Works

An asset swap between two competitors can be (i) per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act or (ii) a potentially legitimate sale of assets under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The case law and antitrust commentary vary as to which standard should be applied, and the impication can be significant for the business entities contemplating the deal. This article outlines five factors to assist in evaluating the asset swap's legality under the federal antitrust laws, and the critical determination of which standard to apply to a potentially high risk transaction.


Why Did The Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, Jonathan Baker Jan 2003

Why Did The Antitrust Agencies Embrace Unilateral Effects, Jonathan Baker

Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals

No abstract provided.


Premiums In Stock-For-Stock Mergers And Some Consequences In The Law Of Director Fiduciary Duties, Lawrence A. Hamermesh Jan 2003

Premiums In Stock-For-Stock Mergers And Some Consequences In The Law Of Director Fiduciary Duties, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.


When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer A Change Of Heart, Celia R. Taylor Jan 2003

When Good Mergers Go Bad: Controlling Corporate Managers Who Suffer A Change Of Heart, Celia R. Taylor

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


Deal Protection Provisions In The Last Period Of Play, Sean J. Griffith Jan 2003

Deal Protection Provisions In The Last Period Of Play, Sean J. Griffith

Fordham Law Review

The ability to protect mergers is important to both targets and acquirors. A series of recent Chancery Court decisions, however, challenges the validity of deal protection provisions in merger agreements and threatens the stability of Delaware's established change of control paradigm. This article argues that last period concerns animate the Chancery Court's decisions and finds, in the last period problem, a theoretical principle capable of harmonizing these decisions with existing jurisprudence and providing a coherent approach to the practical problems raised by deal protection provisions.