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Roundtable With Former Directors Of The Bureau Of Economics, Jonathan Baker
Roundtable With Former Directors Of The Bureau Of Economics, Jonathan Baker
Presentations
The roundtable commemorates the 100th anniversary of the FTC's predecessor agency, the Bureau of Corporations. It was sponsored by the FTC's Bureau of Economics (BE) and focused on BE history and contributions of BE and economic analysis to antitrust and consumer protection enforcement, and to research and economic knowledge and policy. BE was featured because the original functions of the Bureau of Corporations were to collect information, to conduct industry and policy research, to prepare reports at the request of the Congress and the President. The panelists for the roundtable consisted of former BE Directors and Acting Directors from the …
Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise Of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment On Klein And Wiley), Jonathan Baker
Competitive Price Discrimination: The Exercise Of Market Power Without Anticompetitive Effects (Comment On Klein And Wiley), Jonathan Baker
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic Journals
A firm that discriminates in prices faces a downward sloping demand curve, and thus could potentially raise price by reducing output. For this reason, evidence of price discrimination is relevant to assessing the possibility of market power, as antitrust law has long recognized. But price discrimination can be beneficial as well as harmful, and can reasonably be termed competitive if entry is easy. Hence a demonstration that entry is easy rebuts the inference of anticompetitive effect when price discrimination is the basis for proof of market power, breaking the link between market power and anticompetitive effect. Klein and Wiley's proposal …
Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
Anticompetitive Settlement Of Intellectual Property Disputes, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley
All Faculty Scholarship
The overwhelming majority of intellectual property lawsuits settle before trial. These settlements involve agreements between the patentee and the accused infringer, parties who are often competitors before the lawsuit. Because these competitors may agree to stop competing, to regulate the price each charges, and to exchange information about products and prices, settlements of intellectual property disputes naturally raise antitrust concerns. In this paper, we suggest a way to reconcile the interests of intellectual property law and antitrust law in evaluating intellectual property settlements. In Part I, we provide background on the issue. Part II argues that in most cases courts …