Law Commons^™

Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis Of The Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, Paul E. Salamanca

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

For years, the rhetoric of substantive neutrality has dominated interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Under this approach, courts and commentators purport to ask whether a public policy under scrutiny is likely to affect religious choices in an unacceptable way. In fact, so broadly has this approach been taken that both separationists and accommodationists resort to it freely, although with radically differing perceptions as to when policy becomes unacceptable. Arguably, however, adherents to this approach have paid insufficient attention to religious behavior per se. Had they paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon, they would have been forced to acknowledge that little …

The "Blaine" Debate: Must States Fund Religious Schools?, Laura S. Underkuffler

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the United States Supreme Court held-by a vote of 5 to 4-that the funding of religious schools with taxpayer money through voucher programs does not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Emboldened by this success, voucher proponents now attack state constitutional provisions (often called "Blaine Amendments") that prohibit taxpayer funding of religious schools. These state provisions, which may stand in the way of religious-school voucher programs, are attacked as violative of the federal Constitution, rooted in anti-religious bias, or otherwise illegal or unwise.

It is my view that efforts to force states …

Brief Response To Attorney Albright's Article, Peter Brandon Bayer

Scholarly Works

This article is a brief response to another article arguing that the words “under God” do not render the Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional. Attorney D. Chris Allbright’s provocative plea that the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance is insufficiently religious to offend contemporary Establishment Clause principles rests on three wobbly premises: (1) a limited perspective of some of the Framers, one which the Supreme Court rightly has eschewed; (2) Supreme Court dicta reflecting at best certain justices’ cursory suppositions about the religiosity of the words “under God;” and, (3) the wholly irrelevant, and possibly inaccurate argument that the …