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The Liberal Polity And Illiberalism In Religious Traditions, Paul E. Salamanca Jan 2003

The Liberal Polity And Illiberalism In Religious Traditions, Paul E. Salamanca

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

It is in the nature of religious traditions to be somewhat illiberal. Indeed, a religion that does not require its adherents to affirm at least some belief is probably a logical impossibility. Christians, for example, must believe something about the nature of Christ. Even Unitarians, who advocate tolerance of all religions, must affirm a belief in tolerance.

Recently, and largely because of the events of September 11, 2001, enhanced attention has been paid to certain potentially illiberal aspects of Islam in the United States. The journalist Daniel Pipes, for example, has written about certain Moslem Americans who, according to his …


What I Think That I Have Learned About Legal Ethics, Richard H. Underwood Jan 2003

What I Think That I Have Learned About Legal Ethics, Richard H. Underwood

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

In this short piece I want to say a few things that other academics teaching legal ethics may find disturbing. I say this because I believe that I may be swimming against the current academic fashion. Of course, it is possible that I do not have a very good handle on the current academic fashion. I hope I am not setting up a straw person to knock down, but I may be. If I am, I am sure someone will call me to task. What I am going to say is this: contrary to popular belief (among practitioners, at least) …


Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis Of The Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, Paul E. Salamanca Jan 2003

Quo Vadis: The Continuing Metamorphosis Of The Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, Paul E. Salamanca

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

For years, the rhetoric of substantive neutrality has dominated interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Under this approach, courts and commentators purport to ask whether a public policy under scrutiny is likely to affect religious choices in an unacceptable way. In fact, so broadly has this approach been taken that both separationists and accommodationists resort to it freely, although with radically differing perceptions as to when policy becomes unacceptable. Arguably, however, adherents to this approach have paid insufficient attention to religious behavior per se. Had they paid sufficient attention to this phenomenon, they would have been forced to acknowledge that little …