Law Commons^™

A Test For Competition, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Collusion Over Rules, Robert H. Lande, Howard P. Marvel

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Many instances of anticompetitive collusion are designed not to affect prices and output directly, but rather to shape the rules under which competition takes place. They help to cushion competitors from hard competition through such "rules" as restraints on advertising, sham ethical codes, or bans on discounts, coupons, "free" services, or extended hours of operation. Instead of collusion directly over outcomes, firms attuned to the strategic impact of their activities often agree on ways in which to shape their environments in order to soften competition and to insulate themselves from hard competition in ways that will lead to higher prices. …

Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, And Regulatory Policy, Cary Coglianese

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Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Ilana Ritov have recently advanced a cognitive explanation for incoherence in legal decisionmaking, showing how decision makers tend to make micro-level judgments that make little sense when viewed from a broader perspective. Among other things, they claimed to have discovered striking incoherence in regulatory policy evidenced by varied penalty levels across different statutes, with less serious violations sometimes backed up with higher penalties than more serious violations. This paper comments on Sunstein et al.'s treatment of incoherence in regulatory policy, arguing that the same cognitive limitations that Sunstein et al. argue lead to …

Re: Commission's Request For Comments On The Use Of Disgorgement In Antitrust Matters, Robert H. Lande

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This is a submission to the FTC that discusses this agency's use of disgorgement as a remedy in Antitrust matters. It strongly supports the Commission's use of the disgorgement remedy, and gives reasons why the public interest would be enhanced if the agency used this remedy more often. This document was submitted on behalf of the American Antitrust Institute.

Who Determines The Optimal Trade-Off Between Quality And Price?, Barbara Ann White

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The question of the optimal trade-off between quality and price has become increasingly important as well as complex in recent times, as the advances of modern technology permit a far more refined range of choices. These subtleties among choices allow an individual, a group, or a society to titrate more precisely degrees of quality with almost any product or service, coupled, of course, with counterbalancing price consequences.

In 2002, as Program Chair of the Antitrust Section of the Association of American Law Schools, I organized a panel entitled “Guilds at the Millennium: Antitrust and the Professions” and served as one …

U.S. Anti-Trust Law And The Convergence Of Competition Laws, David J. Gerber

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No abstract provided.

Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future Of Competition Law In Health Care, Thomas L. Greaney

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Although instrumental in ushering in competition to the health care industry and later in safeguarding the competitive structure of markets, antitrust law has come under attack. A series of questionable judicial decisions has clouded the standards applicable to analyzing health care markets. Legislative efforts to immunize conduct from antitrust challenge also have gathered support in recent years. This study finds scant economic or policy basis for these developments and concludes that anti-managed sentiments have diluted enthusiasm for applying competitive principles in health care. This phenomenon has resulted in outcome-driven judicial decisions and legislative activity geared to serving political expediency rather …

Vertical Integration And Media Regulation In The New Economy, Christopher S. Yoo

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Recent mergers and academic commentary have placed renewed focus on what has long been one of the central issues in media policy: whether media conglomerates can use vertical 'integration to harm competition. This Article seeks to move past previous studies, which have explored limited aspects of this issue, and apply the full sweep of modern economic theory to evaluate the regulation of vertical integration in media-related industries. It does so initially by applying the basic static efficiency analyses of vertical integration developed under the Chicago and post-Chicago Schools of antitrust law and economics to three industries: broadcasting, cable television, and …