Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, Frederick Tung
Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, Frederick Tung
Michigan Journal of International Law
Although international business firms proliferate, there is no international bankruptcy system. Instead, bankruptcy law remains a matter for individual states. The failure of a multinational firm therefore raises difficult questions of conflict and cooperation among national bankruptcy laws. In the discourse over the appropriate design for an international bankruptcy system, universalism has long held sway as the dominant idea, embraced nearly universally by bankruptcy scholars. Universalism offers a simple and elegant blueprint for international bankruptcy. Under universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm's home country would govern worldwide, enjoying global reach to treat all of the debtor's assets and …
Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen
Game Theory And Customary International Law: A Response To Professors Goldsmith And Posner, Mark A. Chinen
Michigan Journal of International Law
In a pair of recent articles, Professors Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner have used game theoretic principles to challenge the positivist account of customary international law. Their writings join other early attempts to apply game theory to the international law sources. The author has two purposes in this Article. The first is to evaluate game theory's potential for yielding greater insight into customary international law and international law more generally. The second is to respond to the conclusions about customary international law drawn by Professors Goldsmith and Posner.
Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner
Further Thoughts On Customary International Law, Jack L. Goldsmith, Eric A. Posner
Michigan Journal of International Law
In two earlier articles, the tools of game theory were used to sketch a positive theoretical account of customary international law ("CIL"). This theory rejected as question-begging the usual explanations of CIL based on legality, morality, opinio juris, and related concepts. It was argued instead that CIL emerges from nations' pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage. This approach helps explain many overlooked features of CIL, including how CIL originates and changes, why the content of CIL tracks the interest of powerful nations, and why nations change their views of CIL when their interests change. Finally, the practices …