Law Commons^™

Editor's Observations: The 2001 Economic Crime Package: A Legislative History, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

On April 6, 2001, the U.S. Sentencing Commission approved a group of amendments to guidelines governing the sentencing of economic crimes. These measures, collectively known to as the “economic crime package,” are the culmination of some six years of deliberations by both the Conaboy and Murphy Sentencing Commissions working together with interested outside groups such as the defense bar, the Justice Department, probation officers, and the Criminal Law Committee of the U.S. Judicial Conference, The package contains three basic components. First, the now-separate theft and fraud guidelines, Sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1, will be consolidated into a single guideline. Second, the …

A Judicious Solution: The Criminal Law Committee Draft Redefinition Of The Loss Concept In Economic Crime Sentencing, Frank O. Bowman Iii

Faculty Publications

In December 1999, the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission), an institution that had been in suspended animation for over a year with all seven voting seats vacant, fluttered its eyelids and came back to life. An agreement between the Senate and the White House produced seven new Commissioners: five sitting federal judges, the former General Counsel of the Commission, and a law professor. The new group began work immediately, making itself accessible in meetings with lawyers and judges around the country, exuding an air of intelligence and collegiality, and dispensing in short order with a backlog of amendments to the …

New Game Plan Or Business As Usual? A Critique Of The Team Production Model Of Corporate Law, David K. Millon

Scholarly Articles

None available.

The Truth About The New Value Exception To Bankruptcy’S Absolute Priority Rule, David G. Carlson, Jack F. Williams

Articles

No abstract provided.

A Liberal Theory Of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, And The Pareto Principle, Howard F. Chang

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Conundrum Of Executive Compensation, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

Much of the scholarship on executive compensation that appears in law reviews assumes that large U.S. corporations overpay their chief executive officers ("CEOs"). This assumption is understandable, as many of these compensation packages are indeed stunning. The question of whether CEOs are overpaid, however, is complicated. Some scholars in other disciplines, principally in economics and management science, have studied the issue but, as this Article demonstrates, this literature does not confirm the assumption. Indeed, some studies suggest that CEO pay is competitive. Moreover, efforts to reduce the level of executive compensation may have the unintended consequence of achieving the opposite …

Delaware Law As Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary And The Basic Course After Twenty-Five Years, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

A Presumption Of Innocence, Not Of Even Odds, Richard D. Friedman

Articles

Now I know how the Munchkins felt. Here I have been, toiling in the fields of Evidenceland for some years, laboring along with others to show how use of Bayesian probability theory can assist in the analysis and understanding of evidentiary problems.' In doing so, we have had to wage continuous battle against the Bayesioskeptics-the wicked witches who deny much value, even heuristic value, for probability theory in evidentiary analysis.2 Occasionally, I have longed for law-and-economics scholars to help work this field, which should be fertile ground for them.3 So imagine my delight when the virtual personification of law and …

Cruel, Mean, Or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination And Digital Intellectual Property, James Boyle

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Knowledge About Welfare: Legal Realism And The Separation Of Law And Economics, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The welfare state could not function without judgments about how well off its citizens are. For example, governments devise progressive income taxes, which are designed to capture more wealth from the well off and less from the impecunious. These policies presume an ability to take a manageable amount of information about an individual's income or assets and make judgments about her welfare. In fact, people do this all the time, mostly without thinking about the methodological problems involved.

The superficial casualness of our daily observations about welfare belies the state of the economic science of welfare measurement. Economists have attempted …

Linking The Visions, Donald H. Regan

Articles

In my case, which may be unusual, the importance of my non-law training and commitments is not in specific contributions they make to my work in law. Rather, it is in their contributions to my being me.

Agreements To Waive Or To Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, Keith N. Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

As arbitration agreements have grown in use, they have become controversial, with many critics describing them as a disguised form of waiver. This paper presents an economic analysis of waiver and arbitiation agreements and applies this analysis to the evolving arbitration case law in the Supreme Court and elsewhere. The paper examines the conditions under which parties have an incentive to enter into these types of agreement, and their welfare implications. It shows that, if parties are well informed, they will enter into waiver agreements when and only when litigation is socially undesirable, in the sense that the deterrence benefits …