Law Commons^™

The Chicago Conspiracy Trial: Character And Judicial Discretion, Pnina Lahav

Faculty Scholarship

On October 29, 1969, sometime after two o'clock in the afternoon, following yet another heated exchange with defendant Bobby Seale in a courtroom full of spectators, reporters, and armed guards, Judge Julius Jennings Hoffman turned to a marshal and ordered: "Take that defendant into the room in there and deal with him as he should be dealt with in this circumstance."' Judge Hoffman described the aftermath:

In an attempt to maintain order in the courtroom, the Court thereupon ordered the defendant Seale removed from the courtroom at which time he was forcibly restrained by binding and gagging. The defendant Seale …

Political Questions, Judicial Questions, And The Problem Of Washington V. Glucksberg, Carl E. Schneider

Other Publications

Over a century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville famously said, "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question." Physician-assisted suicide superbly illustrates Tocqueville's acute observation. For a number of years, assisted suicide was the prototype of a (nonpartisan) political question. Interest groups brought it to public attention. Public discussion of it flourished. Legislatures debated it. Citizens in several states decided in referenda whether to make it legal. Almost suddenly, however, this classic political process was transformed into a judicial one by the startling and strongly stated …

Recovering The World Of The Marshall Court, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 781 (2000), G. Edward White

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

John Marshall, Mcculloch V. Maryland, And The Southern States' Rights Tradition, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 875 (2000), R. Kent Newmyer

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Classical Legal Naturalism And The Politics Of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 935 (2000), Robert Lowry Clinton

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marshall Misconstrued: Activist? Partisan? Reactionary?, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1109 (2000), Jean Edward Smith

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Comments On Clinton: Reconsidering The Role Of Natural Law In John Marshall's Jurisprudence, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1141 (2000), James W. Ely

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Chief Justice Marshall As Modern, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1145 (2000), Walter J. Kendall Iii

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Marbury, Mcculloch, Gore And Bush: A Comment On Sylvia Snowiss, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1157 (2000), Stephen B. Presser

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Rebalancing Professor Ely's Reappraisal Of The Marshall Court And Property Rights, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1165 (2000), Stephen A. Siegel

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

John Marshall And Indian Nations In The Beginning And Now, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1183 (2000), Milner S. Ball

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Marshall Court And The European Court Of Justice, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1197 (2000), Charles F. Hobson

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Foreword: Causes And Limits Of Pessimism, Stephen B. Burbank

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Making Biomedical Policy Through Constitutional Adjudication:The Example Of Physician-Assisted Suicide, Carl E. Scheider

Book Chapters

Throughout most of American history no one would have supposed biomedical policy could or should be made through constitutional adjudication. No one would have thought that the Constitution spoke to biomedical issues, that those issues were questions of federal policy, or that judges were competent to handle them. Today, however, the resurgence of substantive due process has swollen the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, the distinction between federal and state spheres is tattered, and few statutes escape judicial vetting. Furthermore, Abraham Lincoln's wish that the Constitution should "become the political religion of the nation" has been granted. "We now reverently …

Imagining Justice, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

As we approach the new century and the new millennium, those of us who are legal professionals in liberal capitalist democracies need to drastically improve our practices of law if we are to bring those practices in line with our professed ideals. The commodification and marketing of legal services, for example, combined with a nearly blind commitment to overly combative advocacy, puts legal assistance beyond the means of large segments of the public, severely undercutting our commitment to equality before the law. A different and perhaps harder question, however, is whether the ideals against which we judge our practices are …

Are There Nothing But Texts In This Class? Interpreting The Interpretive Turns In Legal Thought, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Allan Hutchinson remarks at the beginning of his interesting article that Gadamer's writings have had only a peripheral influence on legal scholarship -- only occasionally cited, and then begrudgingly so, and never given the serious attention they deserve or require. Nevertheless, Hutchinson acknowledges, Gadamerian influences can be noted -- particularly in the now widely shared understanding that adjudication is, fundamentally, an interpretive exercise. Even with this qualification, though, I think Hutchinson understates Gadamer's impact. Whatever may be true of Gadamer's influence in other disciplines, his influence in law has been unambiguously both broad and deep -- although it has come …

Regulatory Takings And "Judicial Supremacy", J. Peter Byrne

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The thesis of this Article is that the Court of Federal Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have become exposed to this classic critique of constitutional decision-making through the recent expansions of the regulatory takings doctrine. Though the chief agent for this expansion has been the Supreme Court, these lower courts have made their own prominent contributions to broadening regulatory takings, and they are far more vulnerable to political reprisals. Like the Due Process Clause in the gilded age, the Takings Clause today can easily be and has been seen as an avenue for inappropriate judicial …

Judicial Auditing, Matthew L. Spitzer, Eric L. Talley

Faculty Scholarship

This paper presents a simple framework for analyzing a hierarchical system of judicial auditing. We concentrate on (what we perceive to be) the two principal reasons that courts and/or legislatures tend to scrutinize the decisions of lower echelon actors: imprecision and ideological bias. In comparing these two reasons, we illustrate how each may yield systematically distinct auditing and reversal behaviors. While auditing for imprecision tends to bring about evenhanded review/reversal, auditing for political bias tends to be contingent on the first mover's chosen action. Examples of these tendencies can be found in a number of legal applications, including administrative law, …

Variations On Some Themes Of A Disporting Gazelle And His Friend: Statutory Interpretation As Seen By Jerome Frank And Felix Frankfurter, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

In 1947, this Review published two lectures on statutory interpretation by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter. Both jurists were concerned with a basic question: How constrained are judges when they interpret legislation? The answers each gives, while similar in some respects, differ strikingly. In arguing that interpretation necessarily involves a creative element, Frank analogizes the role of a judge in interpreting legislation to that of a performer in interpreting a musical composition. Although he argues that judicial creativity is constrained, Frank views statutory interpretation as "a kind of legislation." For Frankfurter, by contrast, in construing a statute, a judge is …

Malexandertalet: Ett Tal - Två Situationer, Matilda Arvidsson

Dr Matilda Arvidsson

In this article the court speech delivered by the "Malexander widow", Anneli Ljungberg, is analysed in terms of Lloyd Bitzers "rhetorical situation" and found to work within two different and simultaneous rhetorical situations. Thus, the article shows how a court speech might break with rhetorical conventions of one rhetorical situation because of the conventions governing the other and simultaneously ongoing rhetorical situation.