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Full-Text Articles in Law

Enforcement Of Settlement Contracts: The Problem Of The Attorney Agent, Grace M. Giesel Apr 1999

Enforcement Of Settlement Contracts: The Problem Of The Attorney Agent, Grace M. Giesel

Grace M. Giesel

The issue of the enforceability of settlement agreements entered into by an attorney on behalf of a client is the subject of much confusing judicial comment. this article urges a return to traditional agency concepts. While not widely accepted in the United States, the position that retention of an attorney creates authority should be viewed as a logical and viable position not inconsistent with other rules of law or ethics.


Corporate-Family Conflicts, Charles W. Wolfram Jan 1999

Corporate-Family Conflicts, Charles W. Wolfram

Cornell Law Faculty Publications



Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. And Western Perspectives, Virginia G. Maurer, Robert E. Thomas, Pamela A. Debooth Jan 1999

Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. And Western Perspectives, Virginia G. Maurer, Robert E. Thomas, Pamela A. Debooth

Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business

This article develops an analytical framework for viewing the rules on attorney fee arrangements that have been adopted in the United States and in major western European countries. In section II the paper explains the choice of economic agency theory as a starting point for developing this framework. Within the meaning of economic agency, the attorney is a dual agent, with duties to both the client and the judicial system. In section III the paper identifies five interests that form the basis for evaluating fee systems. These interests are derived from applying basic agency theory to the duties of the …