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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
Formal Legal Truth And Substantive Truth In Judicial Fact-Finding – Their Justified Divergence In Some Particular Cases, Robert S. Summers
Formal Legal Truth And Substantive Truth In Judicial Fact-Finding – Their Justified Divergence In Some Particular Cases, Robert S. Summers
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Truth is a fundamental objective of adjudicative processes; ideally, ‘substantive’ as distinct from ‘formal legal’ truth. But problems of evidence, for example, may frustrate finding of substantive truth; other values may lead to exclusions of probative evidence, e.g., for the sake of fairness. ‘Jury nullification’ and ‘jury equity’. Limits of time, and definitiveness of decision, require allocation of burden of proof. Degree of truth-formality is variable within a system and across systems.
Punishment As Atonement, Stephen P. Garvey
Punishment As Atonement, Stephen P. Garvey
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
How would punishment work in an ideal community, one in which the members of the community identify with one another? In this article, Professor Stephen Garvey argues that punishment in such a community would be understood as a form of secular penance and would form part of the process by which the wrongdoer atones for his wrongdoing. Compared to this account of punishment, which Garvey calls "punishment as atonement," other accounts fall short. The older and dominant approaches of utilitarianism and retributivism offer justifications for punishment that ignore the goal of atonement. Newer approaches, restorativism and libertarianism, recognize the importance …
Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category Of "Mentally Ill And Dangerous", Sherry F. Colb
Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category Of "Mentally Ill And Dangerous", Sherry F. Colb
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
This article considers the constitutional and moral implications of the distinction the law draws between different classes of dangerous people, depending upon their status as mentally ill or mentally well. Those who are mentally well benefit from the right to freedom from incarceration unless and until they commit a crime. By contrast, dangerous people who are mentally ill are subject to potentially indefinite "civil" preemptive confinement.
In a relatively recent case, Kansas v. Hendricks, the United States Supreme Court upheld the post-prison civil confinement of Leroy Hendricks, a man who had served prison time after pleading guilty to child molestation. …
Praxis And Pedagogy: Domestic Violence, Cynthia Grant Bowman, Eden Kusmiersky
Praxis And Pedagogy: Domestic Violence, Cynthia Grant Bowman, Eden Kusmiersky
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Some Thoughts On The Conduct/Status Distinction, Sherry F. Colb
Some Thoughts On The Conduct/Status Distinction, Sherry F. Colb
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Sword": Eviscerating The Right To Present Mitigating Evidence And Beheading The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson
The Fourth Circuit's "Double-Edged Sword": Eviscerating The Right To Present Mitigating Evidence And Beheading The Right To The Assistance Of Counsel, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Even before the sea change of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court recognized not only an indigent’s right to the assistance of counsel in capital cases, but also his right to the effective assistance of counsel in capital cases. Since those auspicious beginnings, the Court has dramatically broadened the right to present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, thereby increasing the need for the guiding hand of counsel in capital sentencing. Thus, it is particularly tragic that the Fourth Circuit’s swiftly evolving approach to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel standard precludes …