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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Law
Larger Board Size And Decreasing Firm Value In Small Firms, Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren, Martin T. Wells
Larger Board Size And Decreasing Firm Value In Small Firms, Theodore Eisenberg, Stefan Sundgren, Martin T. Wells
Cornell Law Faculty Publications
Several studies hypothesize a relation between board size and financial performance. Empirical tests of the relation exist in only a few studies of large U.S. firms. We find a significant negative correlation between board size and profitability in a sample of small and midsize Finnish firms. Finding a board-size effect for a new and different class of firms affects the range of explanations for the board-size effect.
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism By Labor Unions, Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
Michigan Law Review
Labor unions are active again - but this time as capitalists. The potential strength of union pension funds has long been noted, but until recently unions have held their stock passively or invested in union-friendly companies. In the 1990s, however, unions have become the most aggressive of all institutional shareholders. In most cases, it is hard to find a socialist or proletarian plot in what unions are doing with their shares. Rather, labor activism is a model for any large institutional investor attempting to maximize return on capital. Unions, union pension funds, individual union members, and labor-oriented investment funds are …
Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, And Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, David K. Millon
Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, And Corporate Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, David K. Millon
Scholarly Articles
None available.
The Role Of Corporate Law In French Corporate Governance, James A. Fanto
The Role Of Corporate Law In French Corporate Governance, James A. Fanto
Cornell International Law Journal
No abstract provided.
Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, Eric L. Talley
Turning Servile Opportunities To Gold: A Strategic Analysis Of The Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Perhaps no single motif permeates corporate law and governance literature like the problem of agency costs. Though modest in concept, the canonical principal-agent framework yields fundamental insights into virtually every economic relationship involving the firm. These insights, in turn, not only animate prevailing positive accounts of the modern corporation, but they also provide a normative basis for regulating the oft-lamented gulf between ownership and control.
Despite their pervasiveness, problems of agency costs are rarely more vexing than when an agent is also a potential competitor. A notable example of such a scenario occurs when a corporate manager acquires information about …
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration Of The Public/Private Distinction, John C. Coffee Jr.
Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration Of The Public/Private Distinction, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Over their long history, the mail and wire fraud statutes have gone through repeated periods of rapid expansion and contraction. The 1970s saw the flowering of the "intangible rights doctrine," an exotic flower that quickly overgrew the legal landscape in the manner of the kudzu vine until by the mid- 1980s few ethical or fiduciary breaches seemed beyond its potential reach. That doctrine was radically pruned by the Supreme Court in 1987 in the McNally decision, which held that the federal mail and wire fraud statutes reached only those schemes that intentionally sought to deprive their victims of money or …
The Theory, Reality, And Pragmatism Of Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost
The Theory, Reality, And Pragmatism Of Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles
Governing a corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization presents a special case of the age-old problem of the separation of ownership and control. Critics of Chapter 11 have long pointed to the insulation provided by the automatic stay to managers of the business as one of the causes of bankruptcy inefficiency. Protected from the normal contractual and market forces that restrain the behavior of managers of healthy companies, managers of firms in bankruptcy, the harshest critics charge, use delay and other strategies to enrich themselves and the shareholders at the expense of the firm's creditors.
This Article addresses the financial …
The Legality And Utility Of The Shareholder Rights Bylaw, Jonathan R. Macey
The Legality And Utility Of The Shareholder Rights Bylaw, Jonathan R. Macey
Hofstra Law Review
No abstract provided.
Corporate Decisionmaking And The Moral Rights Of Employees: Participatory Management And Natural Law, Stephen M. Bainbridge
Corporate Decisionmaking And The Moral Rights Of Employees: Participatory Management And Natural Law, Stephen M. Bainbridge
Villanova Law Review
No abstract provided.