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The Theory, Reality, And Pragmatism Of Corporate Governance In Bankruptcy Reorganizations, Christopher W. Frost

Law Faculty Scholarly Articles

Governing a corporation during a Chapter 11 reorganization presents a special case of the age-old problem of the separation of ownership and control. Critics of Chapter 11 have long pointed to the insulation provided by the automatic stay to managers of the business as one of the causes of bankruptcy inefficiency. Protected from the normal contractual and market forces that restrain the behavior of managers of healthy companies, managers of firms in bankruptcy, the harshest critics charge, use delay and other strategies to enrich themselves and the shareholders at the expense of the firm's creditors.

This Article addresses the financial …

Debtor Incentives, Agency Costs And Voting Theory In Chapter 11, Scott F. Norberg

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

The Bankruptcy Review Commission Recommendation On Classification Of Claims In Chapter 11, Scott F. Norberg

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Section 365 Recommendations And The Larger Conceptual Issues, David G. Epstein

Law Faculty Publications

In the chapter of the Report of the National Bankruptcy Commission ("Report") entitled "Business Bankruptcy," the National Bankruptcy Review Commission ("Review Commission") makes four recommendations regarding section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code: 2.4.1 Clarifying the Meaning of "Rejection" The concept of "rejection" in section 365 should be replaced with "election to breach." Section 365 should provide that a trustee's ability to elect to breach a contract of the debtor is not an avoiding power. Section 502(g) should be amended to provide that a claim arising from the election to breach shall be allowed or disallowed the same as if such …