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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, Kevin Walsh
The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, Kevin Walsh
Pace Law Review
The mandatory arrest requirement in certain domestic violence situations is unique, due to the fact that no other class of offense requires arrest. The Criminal Procedure Law states that a police officer "may arrest" for all other classes of offenses. The new subdivision states that a police officer "shall arrest a person, and shall not attempt to reconcile the parties or mediate .... ." The use of the word "shall," in contrast to "may," indicates obligation or necessity. Why has this class of offenses been singled out for mandatory arrest? What factors brought this mandatory arrest law about?
The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner
The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.
Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's …
The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner
The Public Safety Exception To Miranda: Analyzing Subjective Motivation, Marc Schuyler Reiner
Michigan Law Review
This Note argues, however, that the appropriate inquiry under Quarles is whether an actual and reasonable belief in an emergency motivated the interrogating officer. This Note proposes a two-prong test to facilitate this inquiry. The subjective motivation prong evaluates the officer's subjective motivation as revealed by objective factors: the. content of the officer's questions, when he asked them, and when the suspect received Miranda warnings. The objective reasonableness prong looks at the objective circumstances to determine the reasonableness of the officer's belief in an emergency.
Part I demonstrates that the Quarles opinion actually contemplates and requires analysis of the officer's …
Improving Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Welsh S. White
Improving Constitutional Criminal Procedure, Welsh S. White
Michigan Law Review
A Review of The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution by Craig M. Bradley
Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff
Chopping Miranda Down To Size, Michael Chertoff
Michigan Law Review
A Review of Confessions, Truth, and the Law by Joseph D. Grano
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Reply: Self-Incrimination And The Constitution: A Brief Rejoinder To Professor Kamisar, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
A Reply to Yale Kamisar's Response to the "Fifth Amendment Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause"
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, Akhil Reed Amar, Renée B. Lettow
Michigan Law Review
In Part I of this article, we examine the global puzzle of the Self-Incrimination Clause and the local confusion or perversion lurking behind virtually every key word and phrase in the clause as now construed. In Part II we elaborate our reading of the clause and show how it clears up the local problems and solves the overall puzzle.
Privacy's Problem And The Law Of Criminal Procedure, William J. Stuntz
Privacy's Problem And The Law Of Criminal Procedure, William J. Stuntz
Michigan Law Review
Part I of this article addresses the connection between privacy-based limits on police authority and substantive limits on government power as a general matter. Part II briefly addresses the effects of that connection on Fourth and Fifth Amendment law, both past and present. Part ID suggests that privacy protection has a deeper problem: it tends to obscure more serious harms that attend police misconduct, harms that flow not from information disclosure but from the police use of force. The upshot is that criminal procedure would be better off with less attention to privacy, at least as privacy is defined in …
Reply, William J. Stuntz
Reply, William J. Stuntz
Michigan Law Review
A Reply to Louis Michael Seidman's Response
Response: The Problems With Privacy's Problem, Louis Michael Seidman
Response: The Problems With Privacy's Problem, Louis Michael Seidman
Michigan Law Review
A Response to William J. Stuntz's "Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure"
On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar
On The 'Fruits' Of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, And Compelled Testimony, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Professor Akhil Reed Amar and Ms. Renee B. Lettow have written a lively, provocative article that will keep many of us who teach constitutional-criminal procedure busy for years to come. They present a reconception of the "first principles" of the Fifth Amendment, and they suggest a dramatic reconstruction of criminal procedure. As a part of that reconstruction, they propose, inter alia, that at a pretrial hearing presided over by a judicial officer, the government should be empowered to compel a suspect, under penalty of contempt, to provide links in the chain of evidence needed to convict him.
The Warren Court And Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, Yale Kamisar
The Warren Court And Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, Yale Kamisar
Articles
Many commentators have observed that when we speak of "the Warren Court," we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1962 (when Arthur Goldberg replaced Felix Frankfurter) to 1969 (when Earl Warren retired). But when we speak of the Warren Court's "revolution" in American criminal procedure we mean the Warren Court that lasted from 1961 (when the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio was decided) to 1966 or 1967. In its final years, the Warren Court was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda v. Arizona.