Law Commons^™

A Modest Proposal For A Political Court, Thomas W. Merrill

Faculty Scholarship

I offer a modest proposal. You can decide for yourself whether it is offered in the spirit of Jonathan Swift, or whether I mean it to be taken seriously.

Brecht V. Abrahamson: Harmful Error In Habeas Corpus Law, James S. Liebman, Randy Hertz

Faculty Scholarship

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, the state could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California to fulfill the federal …

Shouting Down The Voice Of The People: Political Parties, Powerful Pac's And Concerns About Corruption, Clarisa Long

Faculty Scholarship

The Federal Election Campaign Act limits the amount of financial support that political parties may give to candidates for federal office. Clarisa Long argues that these restrictions violate political parties' First Amendment rights of speech and association. Because the flow of money in the political process is a proxy for speech, the First Amendment requires that political actors have access to at least one unrestricted avenue of communication. While individuals' and PACs' First Amendment rights are protected because they may make unrestricted independent expenditures, parties do not have this opportunity. Courts have failed to protect party speech, rationalizing that the …

Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, John C. Coffee Jr., Bernard S. Black

Faculty Scholarship

A central puzzle in understanding the governance of large American public firms is why most institutional shareholders are passive. Why would they rather sell than fight? Until recently, the Berle-Means paradigm – the belief that separation of ownership and control naturally characterizes the modern corporation – reigned supreme. Shareholder passivity was seen as an inevitable result of the scale of modern industrial enterprise and of the collective action problems that face shareholders, each of whom owns only a small fraction of a large firm's shares.

A paradigm shift may be in the making, however. Rival hypotheses have recently been offered …