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1994

Dispute Resolution and Arbitration

Dispute resolution

Series

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1994

Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

The traditional economic model of settlement breakdown -- as developed by Priest and Klein -- provides an important first step in understanding why some lawsuits settle and others go to trial. Rational miscalculation undoubtedly pushes some litigants into court who might otherwise reach out-of-court settlement. Absent miscalculation, however, some litigants still find themselves in court. We have presented experimental evidence suggesting that these litigants may proceed to trial because psychological barriers to value maximizing behavior impede their settlement efforts. Indeed, our research empirically grounds the hypothesis that psychological barriers are powerful causal agents of trials. The usefulness of this evidence …


Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation And Conflict Between Lawyers In Litigation, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin Jan 1994

Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation And Conflict Between Lawyers In Litigation, Ronald J. Gilson, Robert H. Mnookin

Faculty Scholarship

Do lawyers facilitate dispute resolution or do they instead exacerbate conflict and pose a barrier to the efficient resolution of disputes? A distinctive characteristic of our formal mechanisms of conflict resolution is that clients carry on their disputes through lawyers. Yet, at a time when the role of lawyers in dispute resolution has captured not only public but political attention, social scientists have remained largely uninterested in the influence of lawyers on the disputing process. This is not to say that academics have ignored the growth in civil litigation in the United States. Economists have developed an extensive literature that …


Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1994

Opening Offers And Out-Of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go A Long Way, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

When two litigants resolve a dispute through out-of-court settlement rather than trial, they realize joint gains of trade equal to the sum of the costs both parties would have incurred had they obtained a trial judgment minus the costs they incur reaching settlement. This opportunity for mutual gain causes most civil lawsuits to settle out-of-court. Yet, in spite of the opportunity for joint gain, negotiations fail in a significant number of lawsuits. One reason for this surprising result is that even when joint gains are substantial and obvious to the litigants, they still must agree on a method of dividing …