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1993

Constitutional interpretation

University of Michigan Law School

Constitutional Law

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Three Mistakes About Interpretation, Paul Campos Nov 1993

Three Mistakes About Interpretation, Paul Campos

Michigan Law Review

The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is "interpretation." The single most confusing word in modem constitutional theory is "interpretation." What accounts for this unhappy state of affairs?

I will try to show that Barry Friedman's assertions, as well as others that are but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately incoherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language.


The Care And Feeding Of The United States Constitution, Abner J. Mikva May 1993

The Care And Feeding Of The United States Constitution, Abner J. Mikva

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Intelligible Constitution by Joseph Goldstein


The Nonsupreme Court, Kathleen M. Sullivan May 1993

The Nonsupreme Court, Kathleen M. Sullivan

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Constitution in Conflict by Robert A. Burt


Constitutional Judgment, Gene R. Nichol May 1993

Constitutional Judgment, Gene R. Nichol

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Constitutional Interpretation by Philip Bobbitt


Apple Of Gold: Constitutionalism In Israel And The United States, Cynthia A.M. Stroman May 1993

Apple Of Gold: Constitutionalism In Israel And The United States, Cynthia A.M. Stroman

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States by Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn


Social Justice And Fundamental Law: A Comment On Sager's Constitution, Terrance Sandalow Jan 1993

Social Justice And Fundamental Law: A Comment On Sager's Constitution, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

Professor Sager begins his very interesting paper by identifying what he considers a puzzling phenomenon: the Constitution, as interpreted by courts, is not coextensive with "political justice." "This moral shortfall," as he refers to it, represents not merely a failure of achievement, but a failure of aspiration: as customarily interpreted, the Constitution does not even address the full range of issues that are the subject of political justice. Sager regards that failure as surprising-so surprising that, in his words, it "begs for explanation."'