Law Commons^™

Three Mistakes About Interpretation, Paul Campos

Michigan Law Review

The single most important word in modem constitutional theory is "interpretation." The single most confusing word in modem constitutional theory is "interpretation." What accounts for this unhappy state of affairs?

I will try to show that Barry Friedman's assertions, as well as others that are but rephrasings of the same basic ideas, are not the common sense truths that so many constitutional theorists assume them to be, but are instead the products of an extraordinarily confused and ultimately incoherent set of assumptions regarding the interpretation of language.

Constitutional Judgment, Gene R. Nichol

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Constitutional Interpretation by Philip Bobbitt

The Nonsupreme Court, Kathleen M. Sullivan

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Constitution in Conflict by Robert A. Burt

Court-Gazing, Stephen F. Williams

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Supreme Court by David G. Savage and Deciding To Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court by H.W. Perry, Jr.

Apple Of Gold: Constitutionalism In Israel And The United States, Cynthia A.M. Stroman

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States by Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn

The Care And Feeding Of The United States Constitution, Abner J. Mikva

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Intelligible Constitution by Joseph Goldstein

Three Mistakes About Interpretation, Paul Campos

Publications

No abstract provided.

How To Do Things With The First Amendment, Pierre Schlag

Publications

No abstract provided.

Name-Calling And The Clear Error Rule, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Disagreement And Interpretation, Robert F. Nagel

Publications

No abstract provided.

Ordinary Sacraments, Emily A. Hartigan

Faculty Articles

Richard Parker is a true force in constitutional thought, and his Populist commitment finds fertile landscape. However, there is something missing from his account of populism—the role of reflection and the fear of God in human affairs. Parker never deals with the fact that “the people” believe in God. Despite the intellectualist drive to separate God from politics, most Americans do not maintain such a wall. Whether under a stultifying separationist doctrine or in a more open pluralism, the people are God-fearing in an increasingly fractured and fascinating way—they are recognizably, fundamentally religious. Parker advocates being in touch with what …

Constitutional Law And The Myth Of The Great Judge, Michael S. Ariens

Faculty Articles

One of the enduring myths of American history, including constitutional history, is that of the “Great Man” or “Great Woman.” The idea is that, to understand the history of America, one needs to understand the impact made by Great Men and Women whose actions affected the course of history. In political history, one assays the development of the United States through the lives of great Americans, from the “Founders” to Abraham Lincoln to John F. Kennedy. Similarly, in constitutional history, the story is told through key figures, the “Great Judges,” from John Marshall to Oliver Wendell Holmes to Earl Warren. …

Derridoz Law Written In Our Heart/Land: “The Powers Retained By The People”, Emily A. Hartigan

Faculty Articles

Section 26 of the Nebraska Constitution, much like everything affirmative that humans do, is immediately flawed. The flaw sits literally right below this heartfelt declaration of the people’s sovereignty, in an annotation provided for section 26 in the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. This annotation cites State v. Moores, but recites also that the case was overruled, which is wrong for a number of reasons. First, not only does this conflict with other annotations to the same Bill of Rights citing the very same case, but it also ignores the inadequacy of the supposed “overruling” and the existence of an explicit …

Social Justice And Fundamental Law: A Comment On Sager's Constitution, Terrance Sandalow

Articles

Professor Sager begins his very interesting paper by identifying what he considers a puzzling phenomenon: the Constitution, as interpreted by courts, is not coextensive with "political justice." "This moral shortfall," as he refers to it, represents not merely a failure of achievement, but a failure of aspiration: as customarily interpreted, the Constitution does not even address the full range of issues that are the subject of political justice. Sager regards that failure as surprising-so surprising that, in his words, it "begs for explanation."'