Law Commons^™

Davis V. State: Too Young To Consent?, Judson Robert Jahn

Mercer Law Review

In Davis v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a ten-year-old child could not give valid consent to a search of his parents' home. In determining the validity of a minor's consent, the supreme court considered those factors that the court of appeals deemed relevant in Atkins v. State. Applying the Atkins factors, the supreme court held that ten-year- old Darrin Davis ("Darrin") "lacked that degree of mental discretion necessary for a minor to give valid consent to the search of his, and his parents', home." According to Justice Sears-Collins, "[m]ost ten-year-old children are incapable of …

Morgan V. Illinois: The Defense Gets The Reverse- Witherspoon Question, Thomas Joshua R. Archer

Mercer Law Review

In Morgan v. Illinois the United States Supreme Court settled the "reverse- Witherspoon" question. The Court held that a trial court in a capital case must, upon the defendant's request, specifically inquire into a prospective juror's views on capital punishment and that a potential juror who would always vote for a sentence of death, regardless of the facts, must be struck for cause. Further, the Court stated that the presence of even one partial juror on a defendant's panel offends the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury and the sentence may not stand.

Before Morgan …

Resources And Rights: Towards A New Prototype Of Criminal Representation, Laura Gardner Webster

Mercer Law Review

A comprehensive concern in recent criminal procedure decisions in the United States Supreme Court has been the apprehension that certain rights afforded to the accused detract from efficient law enforcement. Efficiency in controlling crime and obtaining accurate verdicts is preferred over the recognition of rights which impede that process. This model of the purposes of the criminal justice system has its origins in the judicial reluctance to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a means of excluding otherwise probative evidence simply because "the constable blundered."' The problems in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are well known. As two commentators have observed, …

Edge V. State: The Modified Merger Rule Comes Up Short, Mark Kenneth Delegal

Mercer Law Review

In Edge v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that a verdict convicting a defendant of voluntary manslaughter and felony murder based in the underlying felony of aggravated assault was improper. The court reasoned that because the jury found Edge guilty of voluntary manslaughter, malice did not exist and therefore, could not be transferred to support a felony murder conviction. Regrettably, the supreme court failed to adopt the merger rule. However, the court adopted a modified merger rule that precludes a conviction for felony murder when a conviction would prevent the jury from an otherwise proper finding of …

The Peremptory Challenge: A Lost Cause?, Robert T. Prior

Mercer Law Review

The recent Supreme Court decision of Georgia v. McCollum marked the culmination of a series of cases dealing with racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in jury selection. In holding that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a criminal defendant to articulate a racially neutral explanation for peremptory challenges before striking jury members of a different race, the Court has significantly undermined the role of the peremptory challenge in American jurisprudence. Beginning with Batson v. Kentucky six years ago, the Court has progressively ruled that under no circumstance will a party on either side of a criminal trial or …