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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Law
A Retributive Theory Of The Pardoning Power?, Hugo Adam Bedau
A Retributive Theory Of The Pardoning Power?, Hugo Adam Bedau
University of Richmond Law Review
During the past two decades; the retributive theory of punishment has made remarkable strides in recapturing the affections of penologists. The story has been told elsewhere and need not be reviewed here. For philosophers, if not for others interested in the theory and practice of punishment, a retributive approach holds a double attraction.
The Role Of Executive Clemency In Modern Death Penalty Cases, Bruce Ledewitz, Scott Staples
The Role Of Executive Clemency In Modern Death Penalty Cases, Bruce Ledewitz, Scott Staples
University of Richmond Law Review
When a governor commutes a sentence of death, typically to one of life imprisonment either with an extended mandatory term or without possibility of parole, how is this action to be understood? As former Governor Pat Brown's book about his commutation decisions illustrates, in a period of widespread support for the death penalty, each commutation contains an appeal for popular support and understanding as to why the decision was made. Where the case for commutation cannot be made to the public's satisfaction, a governor is not likely to act.
Pardon For Good And Sufficient Reasons, Kathleen Dean Moore
Pardon For Good And Sufficient Reasons, Kathleen Dean Moore
University of Richmond Law Review
The preamble to an executive grant of clemency from the Presi- dent of the United States implies that pardons are granted on the basis of "premises,... good and sufficient reasons." Yet, pardons have not always been regarded as the sort of acts that need to be justified by argument. In fact, most presidential pardons are issued without any statement of justification beyond the assurance that good reasons do exist. As a result, the issue of what constitutes good and sufficient reasons for a presidential pardon is seldom addressed and still unresolved.
Executive Clemency In Post-Furman Capital Cases, Michael L. Radelet, Barbara A. Zsembik
Executive Clemency In Post-Furman Capital Cases, Michael L. Radelet, Barbara A. Zsembik
University of Richmond Law Review
In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court invalidated virtually all existing death penalty statutes in the United States. Consequently, those jurisdictions that wanted to continue to execute were forced to revise their capital sentencing procedures. Since Furman,nearly all aspects of American death penalty law have been rewritten. Left unchanged by both the courts and the legislatures, however, are the ways in which states decide which death-sentenced inmates will have their sentences commuted through the powers of executive clemency.
The Quality Of Mercy: Race And Clemency In Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, Margaret Vandiver
The Quality Of Mercy: Race And Clemency In Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, Margaret Vandiver
University of Richmond Law Review
The scholarly literature on capital punishment includes few empirical studies of executive clemency. Commutations in capital cases have been rare since 1972 when the current era of capital punishment began with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Furman v. Georgia. A large proportion of pre-1972 death sentences were commuted; examination of clemency decisions in those cases promises to reveal much about the history of capital punishment in the United States. The present study attempts to identify factors which influenced decisions to grant commutations of Florida death sentences pre-Furman, focusing particularly on whether the race of defendants and victims influenced …
Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative To Escape Accountability, James N. Jorgensen
Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative To Escape Accountability, James N. Jorgensen
University of Richmond Law Review
The United States Constitution vests the President with "power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment." Although Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph raised concerns about the executive branch possibly abusing the pardon power to conceal criminal conduct at the Constitutional Convention, Randolph's colleagues relied upon the presumption that a president would not break the law and defeated his motion to limit presidential pardon power to cases of treason. Recently, the scandalous Iran-Contra affair has demonstrated that, contrary to the Framers' expectations, presidents may circumvent or directly violate federal laws.