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Full-Text Articles in Law
Chapter 5 - Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery And Divorce In Nineteenth-Century America (Previously Published Article), Elizabeth B. Clark
Chapter 5 - Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery And Divorce In Nineteenth-Century America (Previously Published Article), Elizabeth B. Clark
Manuscript of Women, Church, and State: Religion and the Culture of Individual Rights in Nineteenth-Century America
In the covenant of marriage, woman is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master -- the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement. He has so framed the law of divorce . . . as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women -- the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his hands.
Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery And Divorce In Nineteenth-Century America, Elizabeth B. Clark
Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery And Divorce In Nineteenth-Century America, Elizabeth B. Clark
Publications
In the covenant of marriage, woman is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master -- the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement. He has so framed the law of divorce . . . as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women -- the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his hands.
Judicial Review In Section 301 Labor Arbitration Prospective Application Claims: The Effect Of Communications Workers, Seth Michael Popper
Judicial Review In Section 301 Labor Arbitration Prospective Application Claims: The Effect Of Communications Workers, Seth Michael Popper
Fordham Law Review
No abstract provided.
Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg
Aversion To Risk Aversion In The New Institutional Economics, Victor P. Goldberg
Faculty Scholarship
One significant division that emerged during the conference involved the role of risk aversion in analyzing institutional arrangements. I, along with Oliver Williamson, took the position that the risk aversion assumption deflects attention from the more significant determinants and that more progress would be made if we could bind our hands and agree to invoke attitudes toward risk only as a last resort. Professor Richter has graciously given me this opportunity to elaborate upon this theme.
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
The Strategic Structure Of Offer And Acceptance: Game Theory And The Law Of Contract Formation, Avery W. Katz
Faculty Scholarship
The purpose of this article is to promote a particular research program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation. Although I will often simply speak of offer and acceptance in my discussion, I mean to refer to a broader set of issues than are commonly denoted by this doctrinal label. My program transcends the narrow issue of whether particular communications technically should be classified as offers and acceptances, and includes questions often analyzed under the rubrics of implication and interpretation. At its broadest, my argument addresses all legal rules that answer two types of …