Law Commons^™

A Critical Approach To Section 1983 With Special Attention To Sources Of Law, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

The Civil Rights Act of 1871¹ ("§ 1983") establishes a tort-like remedy for persons deprived of federally protected rights "under color of law."'² While the statute's broad language provides a remedy for violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights, the statute itself provides little or no guidance regarding important subjects such as the measure of damages, the availability of punitive damages, the requirements for equitable relief, the statute of limitations, survival of claims, proper parties, and immunities from suit.³...

...The first part of this article examines the narrowly "legal" analysis of § 1983 in the cases …

Choosing Judges The Democratic Way, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

A generation ago, the pressing question in constitutional law was the countermajoritarian difficulty.' Americans insisted their government was a democratic republic and took that to mean rule by a majority of elected representatives in various offices and bodies, federal and local. Yet courts whose members had not won election presumed to override the actions of executive and legislative officers who had. The conventional answer to this apparent paradox was the Constitution, which arguably owed its existence to the people directly. Judicial review was justified, accordingly, when court decisions were rooted firmly in the particular text, structure, or historical backdrop of …

Bad Judicial Activism And Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A Comment On Professor Doernberg And Professor Redish, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

JUDUCIAL ACTIVISM IS often portrayed as a liberal vice. This perception is wrong both historically and, as Professor Redish argues, ³ currently as well. The federal judiciary has been and still is an activist institution, working with both substantive law and jurisdictional rules to achieve its own policy goals. It has done this in statutory, constitutional, and common-law matters. Specifically, the Supreme Court of the United States has actively-shaped the jurisdiction of the federal courts in a restrictive and generally conservative manner.

Professors Doernberg⁴ and Redish attack this last form of activism by the federal courts, activism in shaping …

Foreword Report: Foreword, John D. Feerick, Cyrus Vance

Faculty Scholarship

The last few years have been particularly bad for government integrity in New York. Since 1985, New York City has been rocked by a series of highly publicized scandals, arguably the worst since the days of Tammany Hall. One borough president was convicted of felonies; another committed suicide while under investigation; a congressman was recently convicted of bribery and extortion; former party chairmen in two boroughs were convicted of serious crimes; and a number of agency heads, judges, and lesser officials either have been convicted or forced to resign under a cloud of suspicion. And the City does not have …

Judges, Lawyers And The Penalty Of Death, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Bracton, The Year Books, And The 'Transformation Of Elementary Legal Ideas' In The Early Common Law, David J. Seipp

Faculty Scholarship

The language of the common law has a life and a logic of its own, resilient through eight centuries of unceasing talk. Basic terms of the lawyer's specialized vocabulary, elementary conceptual distinctions, and modes of argument, which all go to make “thinking like a lawyer” possible, have proved remarkably durable in the literature of the common law. Two fundamental distinctions—between “real” and “personal” actions and between “possessory” and “proprietary” remedies—can be traced back to their early use in treatises of the first generations of professional common law judges and in reports of courtroom dialogue from the first generations of professional …

The Mandatory/Enabling Balance In Corporate Law: An Essay On The Judicial Role, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or half empty. The structure of American corporate law – partly enabling, partly mandatory in character – can be viewed in much the same way. Some commentators see American corporate law as primarily composed of mandatory rules that the shareholders themselves cannot waive or modify, In their view, this mandatory component compensates both for the absence of true bargaining among the parties and for the inevitable divergence of interests between the principals (the shareholders) and their agents (the managers and directors). Conversely, other commentators, to whom this Article …