Law Commons^™

A Proposal To Cap Tort Liability: Avoiding The Pitfalls Of Heightened Rationality, Richard S. Kuhl

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note sets forth a model statute that limits high damage awards, yet will withstand the rigors of judicial scrutiny. After presenting a brief background of the medical malpractice crisis in Part I, Part II outlines the standards of equal protection review that the courts are presently using. The Note then focuses on the constitutional challenges to caps on medical malpractice liability in Part III. Part IV discusses the values and interests that were found to be dispositive in the courts' decisions. Finally, after analyzing the criteria that must be met to ensure that a legislative limitation will survive judicial …

Medical Maloccurrence Insurance: A First Party No-Fault Insurance Proposal For Resolving The Medical Malpractice Insurance Controversy, Larry M. Pollack

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Part I of this Note examines the broad, underlying themes of tort theory and argues that, in general, the tort system's primary responsibility should be compensation, rather than deterrence of risk taking. In so far as the production of goods and services causes injury, such losses should be shared and spread as widely and proportionately as possible. Part II discusses the history and nature of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. Part III evaluates the numerous systemic solutions suggested by various commentators. Finally, Part IV proposes a new solution: first party, no-fault medical maloccurrence insurance (MMI).

Limiting Directors' Duty Of Care Liability: An Analysis Of Delaware's Charter Amendment Approach, Craig W. Hammond

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note explores the corporate law principles guiding the amendment of section 102(b)(7) and considers what effects this statute will have on the investor-director relationship. The Note focuses on whether this reform measure excessively protects directors at the expense of shareholders.

Part I analyzes the neoclassical economic view of the contractual relationship between stockholders and management that serves as the theoretical justification of section 102(b)(7). Part II proposes a modification of the Delaware statute that would provide for periodic shareholder review of charter amendments limiting liability.