Law Commons^™

No Peeking: Addressing Pretextual Inspection Demands By Competitor-Affiliated Shareholders, Lin (Lynn) Bai, Sean Meyer

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

This article exposes how Delaware private companies are vulnerable to pretextual inspections under the guise of valuation by shareholders who are affiliated with competitors of the companies. The Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2020 decision in Woods v. Sahara Enterprises, Inc., which deviated from established law by switching the initial burden of proof of the shareholder’s motive to the target company, exacerbated this vulnerability. This article argues for reversing that decision and proposes changes in multiple areas of law to help companies fend off prying competitors who abuse statutory shareholder inspection rights for unfair advantages in competition.

Uncovering Elon's Data Empire, Carliss Chatman, Carla L. Reyes

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

In 2022, Elon Musk publicly announced that he would purchase Twitter after acquiring a five percent stake in the company. His failure to report this acquisition—and the company’s failure to notice—allowed Musk to continue purchasing stock at a deflated price, costing the company more than $156 million. After the signing of a merger agreement, the details of the transaction caused wild fluctuations in Tesla’s stock price. Musk’s complaints about the management of Twitter and the existence of bots on the platform led Twitter’s stock to also drop in value, as did Musk’s attempts to withdraw from the transaction. Even after …

Corporate Law’S Threat To Human Rights: Why Human Rights Due Diligence Might Not Be Enough, Barnali Choudhury

Articles & Book Chapters

The take-up of mandatory human rights due diligence (HRDD) initiatives by states is continuously gaining momentum. There are now numerous states adopting some form of HRDD laws. While corporations being duly diligent in respecting human rights is a positive step towards addressing problems of business and human rights, these HRDD initiatives on their own may only be a form of window-dressing, that is, enabling states to put a smart spin on their efforts to address business and human rights issues without addressing some of the root causes of that predicament. As a result, HRDD laws are likely to be a …

Reforming Shareholder Claims In Isds, Julian Arato, Kathleen Claussen, Jaemin Lee, Giovanni Zarra

Articles

ISDS stands alone in empowering shareholders to bring claims for reflective loss (SRL) – meaning claims over harms allegedly inflicted upon the company, but which somehow affect share value. National systems of corporate law and public international law regimes generally bar SRL claims for strong policy reasons bearing on the efficiency and fairness of the corporate form. Though not necessitated by treaty text, nor beneficial in policy terms, ISDS tribunals nevertheless allow shareholders broad and regular access to seek relief for reflective loss. The availability of SRL claims in ISDS ultimately harms States and investors alike, imposing surprise ex post …

The Exit Theory Of Judicial Appraisal, William J. Carney, Keith Sharfman

Faculty Publications

For many years, we and other commentators have observed the problem with allowing judges wide discretion to fashion appraisal awards to dissenting shareholders based on widely divergent, expert valuation evidence submitted by the litigating parties. The results of this discretionary approach to valuation have been to make appraisal litigation less predictable and therefore more costly and likely. While this has been beneficial to professionals who profit from corporate valuation litigation, it has been harmful to shareholders, making deals costlier and less likely to be completed.

In this Article, we propose to end the problem of discretionary judicial valuation by tracing …

Giving Shareholders The Right To Say No, Albert H. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard

Articles

When a public company releases misleading information that distorts the market for the company’s stock, investors who purchase at the inflated price lose money when (and if) the misleading information is later corrected. Under Rule 10b‑5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, investors can seek compensation from corporations and their officers who make materially misleading statements that the investors relied on when buying or selling a security. Compensation is the obvious goal, but the threat of lawsuits can also benefit investors by deterring managers from committing fraud.

Contractual Stakeholderism, Kishanthi Parella

Scholarly Articles

In 2019, the Business Roundtable announced its commitment to all corporate stakeholders—consumers, employees, suppliers, and communities—and not just shareholders. This announcement has reawakened an old debate over corporate social responsibility. Stakeholderism advocates argue that corporate leaders must consider the interests of the various stakeholders impacted by corporate decision-making. Stakeholderism critics challenge this view, expressing concerns that stakeholderism will magnify managerial agency costs, chill regulation, risk inauthenticity, and lead to impractical solutions.

This Article proposes “contractual stakeholderism” to operationalize stakeholderism in accordance with the views of its advocates but in a way that is attentive to the concerns of its critics. …

Corporate Governance And The Feminization Of Capital, Sarah C. Haan

Scholarly Articles

At the start of the twentieth century, women made up a small proportion of shareholders in American publicly traded companies. By 1956, women were the majority of individual shareholders. Although this change in shareholder gender demographics happened gradually, it was evident early in the century: Before the 1929 stock market crash, women shareholders had come to outnumber men at some of America’s largest and most influential corporations, including AT&T, General Electric, and the Pennsylvania Railroad. This Article synthesizes information from a range of historical sources to reveal an overlooked narrative of corporate history—the feminization of capital, or the transformation of …

Should Labor Abandon Its Capital? A Reply To Critics, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Several recent works have sharply criticized public pension funds and labor union funds (“labor’s capital”). These critiques come from both the left and right. Leftists criticize labor’s capital for undermining worker interests by funding financialization and the growth of Wall Street. Laissez-faire conservatives argue that pension underfunding threatens taxpayers. The left calls for pensions to be replaced by a larger social security system. The libertarian right calls for them to be smashed and scattered into individually-managed 401(k)s. I review this recent work, some of which is aimed at my book, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best Weapon, …

To Call A Donkey A Racehorse—The Fiduciary Duty Misnomer In Corporate And Securities Law, Marc I. Steinberg

Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters

A recurrent theme in corporate law is the presence of directors and officers owing fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the respective companies they serve. Although not as visible in the securities law setting, concepts of fiduciary duty-like obligations arise with some frequency. While the rigorous application of fiduciary standards was applied in days of yesteryear, its adherence today largely is nonexistent. Nonetheless, courts continue to embrace language in their opinions that emphasizes the continued presence of fiduciary duty standards. Reality, however, strikes a very different key. In fact, standards of fiduciary duty have become greatly diluted in the …

Why The Corporation Locks In Financial Capital But The Partnership Does Not, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

Each partner in an at-will partnership can obtain a cash payout of his interest at any time. The corporation, by contrast, locks in shareholder capital, denying general payout rights to shareholders unless the charter states otherwise. What explains this difference? This Article argues that partner payout rights reduce the costs of two other characteristics of the partnership: the non-transferability of partner control rights, and the possibility for partnerships to be formed inadvertently. While these characteristics serve valuable functions, they can introduce a bilateral-monopoly problem and a special freezeout hazard unless each partner can force the firm to cash out his …

Mutual Fund Stewardship And The Empty Voting Problem, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

When Roberta Karmel wrote the articles that are the subject of this symposium, she was skeptical of both the potential value of shareholder voting and the emerging involvement of institutional investors in corporate governance. In the ensuing years, both the increased role and engagement of institutional investors and the heightened importance of shareholder voting offer new reasons to take Professor Karmel’s concerns seriously. Institutional investors have taken on a broader range of issues ranging from diversity and political spending to climate change and human capital management, and their ability to influence corporate policy on these issues has become more significant. …

The Separation Of Voting And Control: The Role Of Contract In Corporate Governance, Gabriel V. Rauterberg

Articles

The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting power. Whether a director is elected or a merger is approved depends on how shareholders vote. Yet, in private corporations shareholders routinely alter their rights by contract. This phenomenon of shareholder agreements—contracts among the owners of a firm— has received far less attention than it deserves, mainly because detailed data about the actual contents of shareholder agreements has been lacking. Private companies disclose little, and shareholder agreements are thought to play a trivial or nonexistent role in public companies. I show that this is false—fifteen …

Rethinking "Political" Considerations In Investment, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Five years ago, Professor David H. Webber was invited to deliver an address both to our Delaware Law School community and to the Delaware Bench and Bar as Visiting Scholar in Residence of Corporate and Business Law. Webber's Speech, "Rethinking 'Political' Considerations in Investment," made several predictions about the rise of politicized investment which were quite prescient. As relevant today as when it was delivered, this piece explores the consideration of investment factors outside the traditional realm of shareholder profit maximization, both in its current state and in the future. Webber's analysis of how investors balance the role of capital …

Second Panel Discussion - Symposium: Who Makes Esg? Understanding Stakeholders In The Esg Debate, David H. Webber, Carmen Lu, Lisa Fairfox

Faculty Scholarship

This symposium was hosted virtually by Fordham University School of Law on October 23, 2020. The transcript has been edited for clarity and to provide sources, references, and explanatory materials for certain statements made by the speakers.

The second panel discussion was on the topic of "Stakeholders as the driving force of ESG." Panelists for the second panel were Carmen Lu, Lisa Fairfax, and David Webber.

Team Production Revisited, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article reconsiders Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout’s team production model of corporate law, offering a favorable evaluation. The model explains both the legal corporate entity and corporate governance institutions in microeconomic terms as the means to the end of encouraging investment, situating corporations within markets and subject to market constraints but simultaneously insisting that productive success requires that corporations remain independent of markets. The model also integrates the inherited framework of corporate law into an economically derived model of production, constructing a microeconomic description of large enterprises firmly rooted in corporate doctrine but neither focused on nor limited by …

Ask The Smart Money: Shareholder Votes By A "Majority Of The Quality Shareholders", Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Corporate directors, shareholders, judges and scholars are on edge. Directors yearn for a certain kind of shareholder, especially one that is patient and focused on the company, as opposed to indexers, who must hold it as part of their basket, or traders, who own fleetingly. Shareholders want a voice, and that patient-focused cohort has the softest one today, crowded out by indexers, like BlackRock, and legions of day traders, like those stalking GameStop. Courts, struggling under the conflicting weight of the business judgment rule and fairness scrutiny, look to shareholder voice as a solution. Yet scholars are troubled by the …

Lessons From Quality Shareholders On Corporate Governance Practice, Research And Scholarship, Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Special Note: This Publication is part of The Quality Shareholder Initiative at the Center for Law, Economics and Finance (C-LEAF), at The George Washington University Law School, Prof. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Faculty Director. This Article presents original data and analysis addressing an understudied force in corporate America: the most patient and focused shareholders. Great attention has been devoted to short-term trading on the one hand and diversified index funds on the other, but scant attention has been focused on long-term concentrated investors. The George Washington University has been redressing this problem through a research initiative focused on such buy-and-hold stock …

Managerial Fixation And The Limitations Of Shareholder Oversight, Emily R. Winston

Faculty Publications

BlackRock’s recent public letters to the CEOs of the companies in which it invests have drawn substantial attention from stock market actors and observers for their conspicuous call on corporate CEOs to focus on sustainability and social impacts on non-shareholder stakeholders. This Article explores the market changes that propelled BlackRock into a position to make such a call, and whether institutional shareholders can be effective monitors of these broad social goals. It argues that while corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders can improve firm value, shareholder oversight of these stakeholder relationships will not succeed in having this effect.

In the past …

The New Gatekeepers: Private Firms As Public Enforcers, Rory Van Loo

Faculty Scholarship

The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies, …

Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon

Faculty Scholarship

Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market-portfolio level, and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power to …

Opt-In Stewardship: Toward An Optimal Delegation Of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

This article offers a theory of mutual fund voting to answer when mutual funds should vote on behalf of their investors and when they should not. It argues that voting authority for mutual funds ought to depend upon: (1) whether the fund possesses a comparative information advantage, and (2) the ability of the fund to assume a common investor purpose. The strongest case for mutual fund voting is one in which high-quality information is produced and the fund is able to assume a common investor purpose. The case for mutual fund voting is weaker when low quality information is produced …

Shareholder Collaboration, Jill E. Fisch, Simone M. Sepe

All Faculty Scholarship

Two models of the firm dominate corporate law. Under the management-power model, decision-making power rests primarily with corporate insiders (officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model defends increased shareholder power to limit managerial authority. Both models view insiders and shareholders as engaged in a competitive struggle for corporate power in which corporate law functions to promote operational efficiency while limiting managerial agency costs. As scholars and judges continue to debate the appropriate balance of power between shareholders and insiders, corporate practice has moved on. Increasingly, the insider–shareholder dynamic is collaborative, not competitive.

This Article traces the development of insider–shareholder collaboration, …

Initiative On Quality Shareholders Highlights, Lawrence A. Cunningham

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Highlights of a research initiative that formalizes the longstanding intuition that the sorts of shareholders a company attracts influences its performance. Contains lists of the best shareholders in corporate America, measured by long holding periods and high portfolio concentration, and lists of the companies that attract such shareholders in high density. Notes and explains how such shareholders and companies have been prone to outperform rivals. Explores what quality shareholders look for in companies and a dozen of the practices and policies that, evidence shows, companies can use to attract quality shareholders. Includes bibliographic references and suggestions for further research.

Golden Parachutes And The Limits Of Shareholder Voting, Albert H. Choi, Andrew C.W. Lund, Robert Schonlau

Articles

With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010, Congress attempted to constrain change-in-control payments (also known as “golden parachutes”) by giving shareholders the right to approve or disapprove such payments on an advisory basis. This Essay is the first to empirically examine the experience with the Say-on-Golden-Parachute (“SOGP”) vote. We find that unlike shareholder votes on proposed mergers, there is a significant amount of variation with respect to votes on golden parachutes. Notwithstanding the variation, however, the SOGP voting regime is likely ineffective in controlling golden parachute (“GP”) compensation. First, proxy advisors seem …

Dual Class Stock In Comparative Context, Christopher Bruner

Scholarly Works

Review of the article by Marc T. Moore, Designing Dual Class Sunsets: The Case for a Transfer-Centered Approach, University College London Faculty of Laws Working Paper No. 9/2019, available at SSRN.

The Other Janus And The Future Of Labor’S Capital, David H. Webber

Faculty Scholarship

Two forms of labor’s capital—union funds and public pension funds—have profoundly reshaped the corporate world. They have successfully advocated for shareholder empowerment initiatives like proxy access, declassified boards, majority voting, say on pay, private fund registration, and the CEO-to-worker pay ratio. They have also served as lead plaintiffs in forty percent of federal securities fraud and Delaware deal class actions. Today, much-discussed reforms like revised shareholder proposal rules and mandatory arbitration threaten two of the main channels by which these shareholders have exercised power. But labor’s capital faces its greatest, even existential, threats from outside corporate law. This Essay addresses …

The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, And Glitches Under The 2017 Tax Legislation, David Kamin, David Gamage, Ari Glogower, Rebecca Kysar, Darien Shanske, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Lily Batchelder, J. Clifton Fleming, Daniel Hemel, Mitchell Kane, David Miller, Daniel Shaviro, Manoj Viswanathan

Articles

The 2017 tax legislation brought sweeping changes to the rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The complex legislation was drafted and passed through a rushed and secretive process intended to limit public comment on one of the most consequential pieces of domestic policy enacted in recent history. This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and deliberation that should have accompanied the bill’s consideration and passage, and describes key problem areas in the new legislation. Many of the new changes fundamentally undermine the integrity of the tax …

2018 Leet Symposium: Fiduciary Duty Corporate Goals, And Shareholder Activism—Introduction, Charles R. Korsmo

Faculty Publications

On November 1, 2018, the Case Western Reserve University Law Review held the 2018 Leet Symposium, bringing together a group of nationally respected corporate law scholars to explore the current state of play between traditional shareholder wealth maximization and modern shareholder environmental and social activism. The Symposium also included a panel on the difficult role of in-house corporate counsel in a world where serving as a zealous advocate for the corporation may conflict with in-house counsel’s compliance function. This issue contains Articles that were presented on the occasion, together with the prepared remarks of the keynote speaker, SEC Commissioner Hester …

Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting In Corporate Law, Sean J. Griffith, Dorothy Lund

Faculty Scholarship

Recent Delaware jurisprudence establishes a disinterested vote of shareholders as the pathway out of heightened judicial scrutiny. The stated rationale for this policy is that shareholders, the real party at interest, are better protected by the ballot box than by the courtroom. As long as informed, disinterested shareholders with an economic stake in the outcome of the vote can effectively express their preferences through voting—the court need not scrutinize the underlying transaction. Rather, it can defer to the outcome under the business judgment rule.

But shareholder voting is not always as direct as this reasoning implies. Instead, voting outcomes increasingly …