Law Commons^™

Slides: Groundwater Law And Administration: From Conflict To Reform, Michael A. Gheleta

Western Water Law, Policy and Management: Ripples, Currents, and New Channels for Inquiry (Martz Summer Conference, June 3-5)

Presenter: Michael A. Gheleta, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, Denver, CO

14 slides

What Is The Settlement Rate And Why Should We Care?, Theodore Eisenberg, Charlotte Lanvers

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

After establishing the importance of knowledge of settlement rates, this article first shows that different research questions can yield different settlement rates. Using data gathered from about 3,300 federal cases in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (EDPA) and the Northern District of Georgia (NDGA), differing measures of settlement emerge depending on whether one is interested in (1) settlement as a proxy for plaintiffs’ litigation success, or (2) settlement as a measure of litigated disputes resolved without final adjudication. Using settlement as a proxy for plaintiff success, we estimate the aggregate settlement rate across case categories in the two districts to …

Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: Lessons To Be Learned From How Florida's Initiatives To Curtail Confidentiality In Litigation Have Missed Their Mark, Roma Perez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Estimating The Effect Of Damages Caps In Medical Malpractice Cases: Evidence From Texas, David A. Hyman, Bernard Black, Charles Silver, William M. Sage

Faculty Scholarship

Using claim-level data, we estimate the effect of Texas's 2003 cap on non-economic damages on jury verdicts, post-verdict payouts, and settlements in medical malpractice cases closed during 1988–2004. For pro-plaintiff jury verdicts, the cap affects 47-percent of verdicts and reduces mean allowed non-economic damages, mean allowed verdict, and mean total payout by 73-percent, 38-percent, and 27-percent, respectively. In total, the non-econ cap reduces adjusted verdicts by $156M, but predicted payouts by only $60M. The impact on payouts is smaller because a substantial portion of the above-cap damage awards were not being paid to begin with. In cases settled without trial, …

The End Of Objector Blackmail?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Courts and commentators have long been concerned with holdout problems in the law. This Article focuses on a holdout problem in class action litigation known as objector “blackmail.” Objector blackmail occurs when individual class members delay the final resolution of class action settlements by filing meritless appeals in the hope of inducing class counsel to pay them a side settlement to drop their appeals. It is thought that class counsel pay these side settlements because they cannot receive their fee awards until all appeals from the settlement are resolved. Although several solutions to the blackmail problem have been proposed, both …