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Speaking Outdoors, Lewis H. Larue

Scholarly Articles

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Standing For Nothing: The Paradox Of Demanding Concrete Context For Formalist Adjudication, David M. Driesen

College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

This article examines a paradox found in public law cases. While justiciability doctrines aim to provide concrete context for adjudication of public law questions by insisting upon individual injury, often the Supreme Court ignores the litigants' injuries when it turns to the merits of cases. Examination of this paradox leads to a fuller appreciation of the structure and nature of public law. In particular, it sheds light on a recent debate in leading law reviews about whether constitutional litigation should be seen as about individual rights or the validity of legal rules. It also raises serious questions about the modern …

Trust Me, I’M A Judge: Why Binding Judicial Notice Of Jurisdictional Facts Violates The Right To Jury Trial, William M. Carter Jr.

Articles

The conventional model of criminal trials holds that the prosecution is required to prove every element of the offense beyond the jury's reasonable doubt. The American criminal justice system is premised on the right of the accused to have all facts relevant to his guilt or innocence decided by a jury of his peers. The role of the judge is seen as limited to deciding issues of law and facilitating the jury's fact-finding. Despite these principles,judges are reluctant to submit to the jury elements of the offense that the judge perceives to be . routine, uncontroversial or uncontested.

One such …

The Constitutional Structure And The Jurisprudence Of Justice Scalia, Bradford R. Clark

GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works

Commentators generally regard federalism and separation of powers as distinct features of the constitutional structure. In reality, these doctrines were designed to work together to further the same goals: to avoid tyranny and to preserve individual liberty. Professor Thomas Merrill overlooks this connection in a recent attempt to explain the Supreme Court's decision making process under Chief Justice William Rehnquist. Professor Merrill maintains that there have been two Rehnquist Courts: one from 1986 to 1994, and another from 1994 to the present. In Professor Merrill's view, the first Rehnquist Court focused on social issues - such as abortion, affirmative action, …

Constitutional Existence Conditions And Judicial Review, Matthew D. Adler, Michael C. Dorf

Faculty Scholarship

Although critics of judicial review sometimes call for making the entire Constitution nonjusticiable, many familiar norms of constitutional law state what we call "existence conditions" that are necessarily enforced by judicial actors charged with the responsibility of applying, and thus as a preliminary step, identifying, propositions of sub-constitutional law such as statutes. Article I, Section 7, which sets forth the procedures by which a bill becomes a law, is an example: a putative law that did not go through the Article I, Section 7 process and does not satisfy an alternative test for legal validity (such as the treaty-making provision …

"Sir, Yes, Sir!": The Courts, Congress And Structural Injunctions, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This is a deeply confused book. Not that the authors' stance is unclear: They have seen federal courts in action, and they don't like what they see. Their subject is federal judicial supervision of state and local governments through injunctive decrees. The authors' position wouldn't be confused - or at least would be confused in a different way - if they dealt with injunctive decrees aimed at enforcing what the judges took to be constitutional requirements. In such cases there's at least something coherent that can be said about judges displacing democratic decision-making. Sandler and Schoenbrod, though, don't deal with …

Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …

New Forms Of Judicial Review And The Persistence Of Rights - And Democracy-Based Worries, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Recent developments in judicial review have raised the possibility that the debate over judicial supremacy versus legislative supremacy might be transformed into one about differing institutions to implement judicial review. Rather than posing judicial review against legislative supremacy, the terms of the debate might be over having institutions designed to exercise forms of judicial review that accommodate both legislative supremacy and judicial implementation of constitutional limits. After examining some of these institutional developments in Canada, South Africa, and Great Britain, this Article asks whether these accommodations, which attempt to pursue a middle course, have characteristic instabilities that will in the …

Non-Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Professor Mark Tushnet challenges the view that democratic constitutionalism requires courts to dominate constitutional review. He provides three diverse examples of non-judicial institutions involved in constitutional review and examines the institutional incentives to get the analysis" right." Through these examples, Professor Tushnet argues that non-judicial actors may perform constitutional review that is accurate, effective, and capable of gaining public acceptance. Professor Tushnet recommends that scholars conduct further research into non-judicial review to determine whether ultimately more or less judicial review is necessary in constitutional democracies.